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The United States is a nation in transition, struggling to surmount its 
racist past. This transitional imperative underpins American race 
jurisprudence, yet the transitional bases of decisions are rarely 
acknowledged and sometimes even denied.  
This Article uncovers two main ways that the Supreme Court has sought 
“racial transition.” While Civil Rights era decisions focused on 
“reckoning” with the legacies of racism, more recent decisions have 
prioritized “distancing” the United States of today from its antebellum and 
Jim Crow histories. With this shift, civil rights measures that were once 
deemed necessary and urgent have been declared inappropriate and 
outdated. By rereading opinions concerning school desegregation, voting 
rights, affirmative action, and disparate impact in terms of reckoning and 
distancing, this Article provides key insights into racial equality law’s 
history as well as a glimpse into its likely future under the Roberts Court. 
Because both reckoning and distancing approaches claim to advance 
transition, this Article evaluates these approaches from the perspective of 
transitional justice, a field that helps societies to overcome histories of 
oppression. This analysis highlights how the Supreme Court’s inadequate 
treatment of transitional justice values (accountability, redress, non-
repetition, and reconciliation) has inhibited America’s transition from 
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white supremacy. Transitional justice theory further offers a novel account 
of judicial disagreements and independent criteria for deciding which 
claims about transition should have purchase. 
As protestors demand a reckoning with America’s legacies of racism, the 
Roberts Court appears poised to leave the past behind. A distancing 
jurisprudence limits not just what the Court sees as constitutionally 
required, but what it sees as constitutionally permissible in the pursuit of 
transition. This Article considers how advocates can seek to reorient race 
jurisprudence toward greater racial reckoning, while simultaneously 
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“[W]e are not far distant from an overtly discriminatory past, and the 
effects of centuries of law-sanctioned inequality remain painfully evident in 
our communities and schools.” 
—Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg (2003)1 
“Nearly 50 years later, things have changed dramatically.” 
—Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. (2013)2 
INTRODUCTION 
The United States is a nation in transition, struggling to surmount its 
racist past.3 After two and a half centuries of indenture and slavery (1619–
 
1. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 298 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
2. Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 547 (2013). 
3. This Article focuses on anti-Black racism because of its historical and contemporary 
significance to the United States. Historian Nell Irvin Painter explains that the construction of race in 
 











1865), Reconstruction (1865–1877) made promises of equality and 
enfranchisement that were never realized.4 A century of Jim Crow ensued 
(1877–1960s), with widespread racial violence and racist laws so oppressive 
that they became a model for Hitler’s Germany.5 With the Civil Rights 
Movement and the Second Reconstruction (1950s–1968), the nation again 
attempted to address abuses against Black people and other racial 
minorities.6  Yet, despite the important gains of this era, civil rights for 
minority groups were met with massive resistance and a long period of 
racial retrenchment that continues to this day.7 
 
the United States was created through a black/white binary and that “[this] fundamental black/white 
binary endures, even though the category of whiteness . . . effectively expands.” NELL IRVIN PAINTER, 
THE HISTORY OF WHITE PEOPLE 396 (2010). At the same time, it is necessary to grapple with the 
treatment of other racialized groups, including Indigenous/Native Americans, Latinx/Chicanx 
Americans, and Asian Americans, in order to redress the past, reimagine the future, and build cross-
racial solidarity. Juan F. Perea, The Black/White Binary Paradigm of Race: The “Normal Science” of 
American Racial Thought, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 1213 (1997); Maggie Blackhawk, Federal Indian Law as 
Paradigm Within Public Law, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1787 (2019). While the racial equality opinions 
analyzed here are principally concerned with African Americans, many address other racial minorities. 
Future works may build upon this analysis by engaging additional histories and bodies of law such as 
the Cherokee Cases, the Chinese Exclusion Cases, and the Insular Cases. See, e.g., Blackhawk, supra at 
1820–25 (discussing the Cherokee Cases); Natsu Taylor Saito, The Enduring Effect of the Chinese 
Exclusion Cases: The “Plenary Power” Justification for On-Going Abuses of Human Rights, 10 ASIAN 
L.J. 13 (2003) (discussing the Chinese Exclusion Cases); Aziz Rana, How We Study the Constitution: 
Rethinking the Insular Cases and Modern American Empire, YALE L.J.F. (Nov. 2, 2020), https://www.y 
alelawjournal.org/pdf/RanaEssay_fiqm5kch.pdf [https://perma.cc/QL7G-8YPU] (discussing the Insular 
Cases). Scholars may also develop transitional accounts centered on the treatment of women, LGBTQ+ 
people, or other marginalized communities in the United States. For accounts drawing links between the 
struggle for civil rights on the basis of race and the struggle of civil rights on the basis of gender, see, 
for example, Pauli Murray & Mary O. Eastwood, Jane Crow and the Law: Sex Discrimination and Title 
VII, 34 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 232 (1965); SERENA MAYERI, REASONING FROM RACE: FEMINISM, LAW, 
AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION (2014). 
4. See generally A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., IN THE MATTER OF COLOR: RACE AND THE 
AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS: THE COLONIAL PERIOD (1978); STEPHANIE M. H. CAMP, CLOSER TO 
FREEDOM: ENSLAVED WOMEN AND EVERYDAY RESISTANCE IN THE PLANTATION SOUTH (2004); W. E. 
B. DU BOIS, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION IN AMERICA, 1860–1880 (1935); JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN & 
EVELYN BROOKS HIGGINBOTHAM, FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM: A HISTORY OF AFRICAN AMERICANS 
(9th ed. 2010); LAURA F. EDWARDS, GENDERED STRIFE AND CONFUSION: THE POLITICAL CULTURE OF 
RECONSTRUCTION (1997). 
5. JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HITLER’S AMERICAN MODEL: THE UNITED STATES AND THE MAKING 
OF NAZI RACE LAW (2017). See generally GLENDA ELIZABETH GILMORE, GENDER AND JIM CROW: 
WOMEN AND THE POLITICS OF WHITE SUPREMACY IN NORTH CAROLINA, 1896–1920 (1996); EVELYN 
BROOKS HIGGINBOTHAM, RIGHTEOUS DISCONTENT: THE WOMEN’S MOVEMENT IN THE BLACK 
BAPTIST CHURCH, 1880–1920 (1993); MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE 
SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY (2004); ERIC FONER, THE SECOND 
FOUNDING: HOW THE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION REMADE THE CONSTITUTION (2019). 
6. See generally Jacquelyn Dowd Hall, The Long Civil Rights Movement and the Political Uses 
of the Past, 91 J. AM. HIST. 1233 (2005); RISA L. GOLUBOFF, THE LOST PROMISE OF CIVIL RIGHTS 
(2007); TOMIKO BROWN-NAGIN, COURAGE TO DISSENT: ATLANTA AND THE LONG HISTORY OF THE 
CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (2011); CHARLES M. PAYNE, I’VE GOT THE LIGHT OF FREEDOM: THE 
ORGANIZING TRADITION AND THE MISSISSIPPI FREEDOM STRUGGLE (1995). 
7. See generally Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: 













The Supreme Court has played a leading part in this transition story. For 
much of its history, the Court’s decisions openly enshrined white 
supremacy. 8  However, particularly since its 1954 decision in Brown v. 
Board of Education,9 transitional perspectives have shaped the Court’s race 
jurisprudence.10 Justices across the political spectrum ground arguments in 
the need to overcome racial wrongdoings and divisions. Recent decisions 
limiting civil rights, like Parents Involved v. Seattle11 and Shelby County v. 
Holder,12 are as steeped in transitional reasoning as the landmark decision 
in Brown, although their underlying theories of transition are quite different.  
Legal scholarship has yet to focus on these different theories of 
transition, despite their significance for which wrongs are redressed and 
which remedies are deemed legitimate. This Article uncovers two main 
ways that the Supreme Court has sought racial transition—reckoning with 
and distancing from the past. Because these two frameworks are more 
dynamic than the prevailing theories of equal protection, they allow us to 
see race jurisprudence in a new light.13  
In the Civil Rights era, the Supreme Court enforced and extended 
measures designed to address the legacies of historical racism. But with the 
civil rights retrenchment and conservative appointments starting in the late 
1960s, the Court’s decisions moved from reckoning toward distancing. In 
trying to disassociate the United States of today from its antebellum and Jim 
Crow histories, the Court denounced blatant forms of racism from the past 
while discounting the racism present today and denying continuities 
between past and present racism. The Court also became preoccupied with 
identifying a discrete end point of the transition process—the point at which 
America’s links to its racist past would be deemed severed once and for all 
 
HANEY LÓPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE (2006); Sumi Cho, Post-
Racialism, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1589 (2009); EDUARDO BONILLA-SILVA, WHITE SUPREMACY AND RACISM 
IN THE POST-CIVIL RIGHTS ERA (2001). 
8. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 
(1896). 
9. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).  
10. As a result, some of the Court’s most important debates about racial equality are better 
understood as debates about transition. For instance: Does affirmative action help or hinder transition 
to a society free of race-based discrimination? Are desegregation plans and voter protections as 
necessary and appropriate today as when they were first introduced? 
11. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007). 
12. Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013). 
13. Racial equality opinions are said to reason from two main theories of equal protection: “anti-
classification” theory concerned with individual colorblindness and “anti-subordination” theory 
concerned with group inequalities. See generally Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil 
Rights Tradition: Anticlassification or Antisubordination?, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 9 (2003). Distancing 
and reckoning frameworks enrich and extend beyond these theories by weaving in different 
interpretations of historical memory, understandings of current circumstances, and ideals for the future. 
See infra Part II.A.  











and “extraordinary” policies such as voter protections and affirmative action 
would be cast aside. 
With this shift from reckoning to distancing, civil rights measures that 
were once deemed necessary and urgent were declared inappropriate and 
outdated—and even antithetical to the project of ensuring a racially just 
society. Today, this distancing approach dominates the jurisprudence of an 
increasingly conservative Court, largely relegating reckoning approaches to 
liberal dissents.14 
These trends are likely to accelerate with a durable conservative majority 
on the Supreme Court. 15  The Roberts Court can be expected to use 
distancing arguments to depart from racial equality precedent, to 
discontinue or weaken current measures that redress racial harms, and to 
inhibit the introduction of similar measures in the future. This distancing 
jurisprudence would constrain efforts to address racial inequality through 
other channels such as school integration plans, voting rights legislation, 
affirmative action programs, and disparate impact assessments. How the 
Court interprets transition thus has consequences not only for the 
development of legal doctrine, but also for how law affects social spheres 
from education to housing. This Article offers guidance on how racial 
justice advocates can seek to reorient a predominantly distancing 
jurisprudence toward greater racial reckoning, while simultaneously 
pursuing reckoning through other means. 
Furthermore, this Article’s transitional justice lens places the Supreme 
Court’s efforts within a global conversation. Transitional justice is a field 
of practice and research concerned with how societies move from 
oppression and violence toward a more just and peaceful order. 16 
 
14. Leading scholars have identified some of these features in specific lines of cases without 
synthesizing trends across bodies of law or theorizing jurisprudential approaches in transitional terms. 
See, e.g., Kimberlé W. Crenshaw, “Framing Affirmative Action”, 105 MICH. L. REV. FIRST 
IMPRESSIONS 123, 128 (2007) (arguing that “the racial past” in affirmative action opinions “has been 
pictured as a distant reality disconnected from the present”); Elise C. Boddie, The Contested Role of 
Time in Equal Protection, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1825, 1826 (2017) (observing with respect to 
desegregation that opinions “obscure the relationship between present-day racial inequality and past 
discrimination”). 
15. This is an account of what could happen given a politically conservative Supreme Court; this 
account is therefore contingent on the Court continuing to be at least as conservative as the present Court 
for the foreseeable future, and functioning as it has in recent decades. However, the future of the Court 
itself is uncertain; Joseph Biden has indicated that he will create a commission to study judicial reform. 
Alicia Bannon & Zachary Laub, Court Reform Gets New Attention, BRENNAN CTR. (Dec. 30, 2020), htt 
ps://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/court-reform-gets-new-attention [https://perma. 
cc/8Y86-8E9L]. The implementation of either “personnel” or “disempowering” reforms could 
dramatically change the Court in the coming years. See Ryan Doerfler & Samuel Moyn, Democratizing 
the Supreme Court, 109 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021). 
16. Transitional justice practice involves developing and implementing processes to overcome 













Transitional justice focuses on promoting accountability for wrongdoings,17 
opening political and social space to marginalized people, 18  providing 
redress for and ensuring non-repetition of injustices, 19  and facilitating 
societal reconciliation by alleviating negative emotions20 and transforming 
individual and communal identities,21 to name a few key concerns. Societies 
pursue these concerns through such measures as truth commissions and 
reparations programs, with courts often playing a central role. 
While the United States has sought a racial transition from slavery and 
Jim Crow, it has largely eschewed transitional justice in response to racist 
human rights violations. The United States has advocated truth commissions 
and other transitional justice measures abroad, yet neglected the need for 
such measures at home.22 Recently, the tragic killings of Breonna Taylor, 
Tony McDade, George Floyd, and countless other Black people have led to 
increased calls for transitional justice in this country, which is a marked 
change from the norm of the United States focusing on transitional justice 
in other countries.23 
 
commissions, criminal prosecutions, reparations programs, and institutional reforms. See generally What 
is Transitional Justice?, INT’L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUST., https://www.ictj.org/about/transitional-j 
ustice [https://perma.cc/6Q82-JV2L]. Transitional justice research contemplates questions of 
“transition” (what constitutes a transition and how a transition should be accomplished) and those of 
“justice” (what justice requires and what shape justice should take). See generally RUTI G. TEITEL, 
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE (2000); Pablo de Greiff, Theorizing Transitional Justice, 51 NOMOS 31 (2012) 
[hereinafter Theorizing Transitional Justice]; Laurel E. Fletcher & Harvey M. Weinstein, Writing 
Transitional Justice: An Empirical Evaluation of Transitional Justice Scholarship in Academic 
Journals, 7 J. HUM. RTS. PRAC. 177 (2015); see also infra note 23. 
17. Naomi Roht-Arriaza, State Responsibility to Investigate and Prosecute Grave Human Rights 
Violations in International Law, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 449 (1990); Juan E. Méndez, Accountability for Past 
Abuses, 19 HUM. RTS. Q. 255 (1997). 
18. Alex Jeffrey, The Political Geographies of Transitional Justice, 36 TRANSACTIONS INST. 
BRIT. GEOGRAPHERS 344 (2011). 
19. Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Measures of Non-repetition in Transitional Justice: The Missing Link?, 
in FROM TRANSITIONAL TO TRANSFORMATIVE JUSTICE (Paul Gready & Simon Robins eds., 2016) 
[hereinafter Measures of Non-repetition in Transitional Justice]. 
20. MIHAELA MIHAI, NEGATIVE EMOTIONS AND TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE (2016). 
21. PAIGE ARTHUR, IDENTITIES IN TRANSITION: CHALLENGES FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN 
DIVIDED SOCIETIES (Paige Arthur ed., 2010); Nevin T. Aiken, Rethinking Reconciliation in Divided 
Societies: A Social Learning Theory of Transitional Justice, in TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE THEORIES 40, 
49 (Susanne Buckley-Zistel, Teresa Koloma Beck, Christian Braun & Friederike Mieth eds., 2013). 
22. For decades, U.S.-based discussions of transitional justice have gazed outward 
internationally while overlooking the legacies of white supremacy at home. Yuvraj Joshi, Does 
Transitional Justice Belong in the United States?, JUST SEC. (July 13, 2020), https://www.justsecurity.or 
g/71372/does-transitional-justice-belong-in-the-united-states/ [https://perma.cc/J9GW-9EZT] 
[hereinafter Does Transitional Justice Belong in the United States?]. In limited ways, the United States 
has employed its own versions of transitional justice mechanisms, such as affirmative action. See 
generally Yuvraj Joshi, Affirmative Action as Transitional Justice, 2020 WIS. L. REV. 1 [hereinafter 
Affirmative Action as Transitional Justice]. 
23. Transitional justice in the United States has gained prominence in two senses. First, racial 
justice protestors and advocates have reissued longstanding demands that are fundamentally calling for 
transitional justice. See Does Transitional Justice Belong in the United States?, supra note 22. Second, 
 











As the United States continues to struggle with the perpetuation of 
systemic racism in different forms, a transitional justice assessment of 
Supreme Court decision-making is urgently needed. This assessment 
reveals the Court’s inadequate treatment of transitional justice values 
(accountability, redress, non-repetition, and reconciliation) that have been 
considered crucial in other societies.24 Inadequate attention to these values 
may be an important reason why the United States has struggled to surmount 
its racist past. Transitional justice theory provides a basis not only for 
evaluating American transitional approaches, but also for improving how 
courts and other segments of society pursue these values. 
This Article’s transitional perspective thus provides a richer 
understanding of current racial equality doctrine, insights into its history and 
 
practitioners and researchers working within the field of transitional justice have directed increased 
attention to the United States. For example, the International Center for Transitional Justice, which has 
been based in New York City since 2001, is said to be preparing its first U.S.-focused report. See 
Fernando Travesí, Here We Are Again: Will Racist Violence in the United States Ever End?, INT’L CTR. 
FOR TRANSITIONAL JUST. (June 5, 2020), https://www.ictj.org/news/here-we-are-again-will-racist-viole 
nce-united-states-ever-end [https://perma.cc/R462-XUBY]; Jack Herrera, What Would ‘Transitional 
Justice’ Look Like in the United States?, PRISM (Dec. 9, 2020), https://www.prismreports.org/article/202 
0/12/9/what-would-transitional-justice-look-like-in-the-united-states.  
Even before the most recent protests, a number of advocates and scholars had called for transitional 
justice approaches in the United States. For instance, Sherrilyn Ifill’s 2007 book, On the Courthouse 
Lawn, elaborated transitional justice principles for American struggles with racism. SHERRILYN A. IFILL, 
ON THE COURTHOUSE LAWN: CONFRONTING THE LEGACY OF LYNCHING IN THE TWENTY-FIRST 
CENTURY XV (rev. ed. 2018) [hereinafter On the Courthouse Lawn]. Ta-Nehisi Coates’ 2014 Atlantic 
article reminded Americans that broader reparations are still pending more than two centuries after 
freedwoman Belinda Royall successfully petitioned for a pension from her former enslaver’s estate. Ta-
Nehisi Coates, The Case for Reparations, ATLANTIC (June 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/ 
magazine/archive/2014/06/the-case-for-reparations/361631/ [https://perma.cc/E7T3-6M7F]. Religion 
professor Anthony Bradley’s 2018 essay applied the “Chicago Principles of Post-conflict Justice” to 
individual American states. Anthony Bradley, Finally Healing the Wounds of Jim Crow, FATHOM MAG. 
(July 11, 2018), https://www.fathommag.com/stories/finally-healing-the-wounds-of-jim-crow [https://p 
erma.cc/4AQF-HS4R24]. Yet, even as the United States government endorsed economic reparations, 
truth commissions, and memorial building for countries transitioning out of repressive regimes, it 
ignored transitional justice at home. See Transitional Justice Overview, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (May 16, 
2016), https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/257771.pdf [https://perma.cc/D2AZ-6CE 
Y]; Anand Giridharadas, Turning the Call for Racial Reckonings Back on the U.S., N.Y. TIMES (July 
18, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/19/us/truth-reconciliation-commission-slavery.html [http 
s://perma.cc/2387-M4BF].  
This Article looks to transitional justice for descriptive and normative guidance to better understand 
U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence. See generally Affirmative Action as Transitional Justice, supra note 
22. It draws on transitional justice research that not only describes various countries’ transitional 
approaches, but also identifies promises and limitations of transitional approaches and distinguishes 
between desirable and undesirable transitional justice. For critical research on transitional justice, see, 
for example, Patricia Lundy & Mark McGovern, Whose Justice? Rethinking Transitional Justice from 
the Bottom Up, 35 J.L. SOC’Y 265 (2008); Kieran McEvoy & Lorna McGregor, Transitional Justice 
from Below: An Agenda for Research, Policy and Praxis, in TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE FROM BELOW: 
GRASSROOTS ACTIVISM AND THE STRUGGLE FOR CHANGE 1 (Kieran McEvoy & Lorna McGregor eds., 
2008); Augustine SJ Park, Settler Colonialism, Decolonization and Radicalizing Transitional Justice, 
16 INT’L J. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 260 (2020). 
24. See U.N. Secretary-General, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-












likely future, independent criteria for critiquing it, and new ideas for 
reorienting it. At the same time, court cases serve as valuable case studies 
for thinking about the racial transition project. Analyzing legal opinions 
allows us to recognize the Supreme Court as one node in a broader network 
of agents working toward and against particular kinds of transition. Once 
we understand how the Court pursues racial transition, we will be in a better 
position to think about the various spheres and actors involved in this 
project, the different paths available to transition, and the values at stake. 
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I presents a transitional account of 
racial justice and injustice in the United States, rebutting the argument that 
the United States is non-transitional. It briefly describes the transition from 
slavery to the present day and the value of viewing American society and 
jurisprudence from a transitional perspective. 
Part II develops the frameworks of reckoning and distancing to analyze 
Supreme Court opinions in four areas: school desegregation, voting rights, 
affirmative action, and disparate impact. The Court in these cases not only 
makes judgments about racial equality, but offers narratives about the racial 
past, present, and future and theories of racial change. Rereading landmark 
cases through the prism of reckoning and distancing reveals how judges 
have understood racial transition and how judicial accounts of transition 
have evolved over time. Applying this analysis to the Court’s recent 
decision in Ramos v. Louisiana highlights how conservative Justices differ 
in their transitional approaches not only from their liberal colleagues, but 
also from one another. 
Part III uses transitional justice theory to evaluate the Supreme Court’s 
decision-making around race. This analysis indicates that the Court has 
underestimated key transitional justice values and that disagreements within 
race jurisprudence reflect struggles over the ownership of transition and 
over America’s “unmastered past.”25 It further points to how transitional 
justice frameworks can be used to evaluate the competing claims emanating 
from the Court and to decide which claims about transition should have 
purchase. 
While the Supreme Court may not be the most important vehicle for 
racial transition, it is the focus of this Article because its interpretations have 
far-reaching implications for transition efforts elsewhere. America’s 
transition from white supremacy has been constrained not just by the 
political decisions of its leaders, but also by the legal decisions of its judges. 
As protestors demand a reckoning with America’s legacies of racism, the 
Roberts Court seems poised to leave the past behind by declaring that the 
time for reckoning is over. This distancing approach would complicate an 
 
25. See text accompanying infra notes 422–424. 











already challenging legal and political landscape for transition and 
inevitably impact ongoing efforts to achieve structural change.26  
This Article therefore concludes by considering the role that scholars, 
reformers, decision-makers, and publics can play in the continuing pursuit 
of transition. Deeper engagement with the idea of racial transition can 
enable these actors to align laws and policies surrounding race with 
international human rights norms and American civil rights values.  
I. TRANSITION AND THE UNITED STATES 
This Article considers the United States as a transitional society, one that 
like many others is struggling to leave conflict and oppression behind.27 The 
United States has sought to move beyond a racial past marked by deep 
histories and structures of racial domination; it has striven toward a racial 
future that is different from its racial past, and it has experienced an interim 
period of transition that is neither exactly the past, nor yet the desired better 
future.28 
Despite this, the United States is seldom characterized as a transitional 
society. American racial exceptionalism depicts this country as the leader in 
the global struggle for liberty whose own march to racial equality was 
completed long ago.29 The United States is exempted from political and 
legal considerations applied to other transitional societies, despite its 
centuries-long struggle with state-sponsored racial violence.30 However, the 
enduring 31 —and increasingly international 32 —criticisms of the United 
 
26. Ongoing deliberations about whether and how to “save” the Court must account for the ways 
in which the Court can halt or reverse racial transition. For arguments to “save” the Court, see Daniel 
Epps & Ganesh Sitaraman, How to Save the Supreme Court, 129 YALE L.J. 148 (2019). For arguments 
to “disarm” or “disempower” the Court, see Stephen E. Sachs, Supreme Court as Superweapon: A 
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States’ failures on racism should lead us to consider this country alongside 
others with conflictual histories. 
This Part offers a transitional account of racial justice and injustice in the 
United States. It briefly describes America’s transition from slavery to the 
present day, underscoring steps forward and back. This overview provides 
essential historical background 33  and makes original contributions by 
framing Reconstruction and Civil Rights era processes as early forms of 
transitional justice.34 With this history in mind, this Part goes on to explain 
the value of a transitional analysis—one that explicitly recognizes the 
United States’ struggle to surmount its racist past—and addresses potential 
objections to such an analysis. This discussion is the foundation upon which 
this Article later builds a transitional analysis of American race 
jurisprudence. 
A. Racisms, Reconstructions, Retrenchments 
Slavery has been called America’s original sin, one that still haunts the 
nation. Starting in 1619, 12.5 million Africans were captured and brought 
across the Atlantic Ocean; 400,000 of them were sold in the United States.35 
Slavery survived under the Constitution of 1789, and its underlying 
ideology of innate Black inferiority and difference permeated American 
life.36 The Supreme Court further legitimated this racist ideology in its 1857 
decision Dred Scott v. Sandford.37 
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Following the Civil War, Reconstruction attempted to remedy these 
wrongs. In addition to adopting three constitutional amendments, Congress 
enacted legislation including the 1866 Civil Rights Act, which was the 
nation’s first federal civil rights law, and the 1865 and 1866 Freedmen’s 
Bureau Acts, which established the nation’s first federal welfare agency.38 
From 1866 to 1870, the Freedmen’s Bureau opened schools that educated 
approximately 100,000 students each year.39 It also provided funding, land, 
and other assistance to help create colleges and universities for the 
education of Black students. 40  These policies, and others of the 
Reconstruction era such as the promise of 400,000 acres of land for Black 
resettlement,41 would today be recognized as efforts at transitional justice.42  
However, Reconstruction lasted for only twelve years. A loophole in the 
Thirteenth Amendment’s abolition of slavery permitted the forced labor of 
those convicted of a crime, allowing Southern states to tie recently 
emancipated people to their former enslavers through “Black Codes” that 
criminalized such “offenses” as loitering and vagrancy.43 Adding insult to 
injury, Congress voted to close the Freedmen’s Bureau in 1872, after which 
most of its schools closed down.44 Five years later, Rutherford B. Hayes 
gained the presidency by agreeing to withdraw federal troops from the 
South, bringing Reconstruction to a close. Reconstruction thus left 
emancipated people with very limited rights, even fewer resources, and the 
additional pain of unfulfilled promises.  
With the end of Reconstruction came a new wave of white supremacist 
practices.45 Although Jim Crow laws and policies were concentrated in the 
South, racism and segregation were present nationwide.46 Miscegenation 
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laws enforced segregation in marriage and intimate relationships throughout 
most of the country.47 Segregation, like slavery before it, perpetuated the 
idea that non-Whites were different and inferior to Whites. In its 1896 
decision in Plessy v. Ferguson, the Supreme Court ratified racial 
segregation under the “separate but equal” principle.48 
A wide array of state laws and practices, including ostensibly “race-
neutral” ones, disenfranchised Black people and other racial minorities.49 
Lynching, rape, and other forms of violence were inflicted with impunity to 
assert white supremacy.50 Sherrilyn Ifill observes that “even those [Whites] 
who did not actively participate in lynching . . . derived benefits from the 
willingness of their more aggressive neighbors to tend to the more unsavory 
and violent aspects of maintaining white supremacy.”51 
The Second Reconstruction attempted to complete the unfinished work 
of Reconstruction. 52  Segregationists responded to Brown v. Board of 
Education by launching a “massive resistance” and signing the “Southern 
Manifesto,” which voiced opposition to the decision. 53  Despite this, 
Congress enacted the 1964 Civil Rights Act (passed following protests 
throughout the South), which barred discrimination in federally supported 
programs;54 the 1965 Voting Rights Act (passed after the historic marches 
from Selma to Montgomery), which aimed to remove barriers to voting;55 
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and the 1968 Fair Housing Act (passed amid protests following Dr. King’s 
assassination), which prohibited discrimination in the housing market.56 
The Civil Rights era saw deliberative processes that might today be 
labeled as transitional justice. For instance, the 1966 White House 
Conference on Civil Rights brought together over 2,400 participants and 
proposed reforms relating to economic security and welfare, education, 
housing, and administration of justice.57 In 1968, the National Advisory 
Commission on Civil Disorders, called the Kerner Commission, cautioned: 
“Our Nation is moving toward two societies, one black, one white—
separate and unequal.” 58  These reports proposed holistic approaches to 
societal transition that find support in contemporary transitional justice 
theory. 59  However, Lyndon B. Johnson shelved the Kerner Report’s 
recommendations, avoiding a systematic racial reckoning and prolonging 
racial disparities and discontentment that continue to this day.60 
Ultimately, the Second Reconstruction yielded to racial retrenchment. 
The “Southern strategy” to attract Southern White Democrats to the 
Republican party used coded racist rhetoric, helping elect Richard Nixon in 
1968 and 1972 and Ronald Reagan in 1980. 61  Their policies and 
appointments to the Supreme Court halted and reversed many of the gains 
made during the Civil Rights era.62 This backtrack on racial equity took 
various forms, from the resegregation of public schools after being released 
from court-mandated desegregation63 to the development of punitive crime 
policy that “both responded to and moved the agenda on civil rights.”64 
Despite a long period of racial retrenchment, the pursuit of racial 
transition continues. Recent waves of anti-racist protests have resurfaced 
demands for police reform, defunding, and abolition to address police 
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violence, truth and reconciliation processes to acknowledge historical and 
ongoing injustices, and reparations for decades and centuries of racist 
oppression.65 Memorials and museums dedicated to the histories of racial 
violence have been created.66 Some U.S. cities and states have initiated 
truth, justice, and reconciliation processes, as well as reparations 
programs.67 Universities and theological seminaries have offered limited 
reparations to the descendants of enslaved people from whom they 
profited.68 However, attempts to secure broader reparations for slavery, Jim 
Crow practices, and ongoing discrimination have stalled.69 
In short, racism did not end with the abolition of slavery and Jim Crow—
it endured and evolved. Nor was racial transition completed with the First 
and Second Reconstructions—it was postponed and prolonged. In this 
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Article, recognizing this transitional context and how it has shaped the law 
helps us to better understand several decades of American jurisprudence. 
B. Toward a Transitional Analysis of American Jurisprudence 
1. Benefits of a Transitional Analysis 
This Article demonstrates how transitional concerns permeate a series of 
racial equality debates that Americans are having. However, a number of 
factors have prevented widespread application of a transitional analysis to 
the United States. The United States’ centuries of racist violence and 
multiple attempts at redemption do not lend themselves to simple 
transitional analysis. American exceptionalism presents the United States as 
a champion of liberty since its founding rather than a society rooted in white 
supremacy and settler colonialism.70 Many Americans take democracy as a 
given instead of recognizing the development of democracy in this country 
as an ongoing and evolving process.71 Furthermore, American legal debates 
have calcified around particular theories of equal protection that do not 
explicitly take transitional dynamics into account.72 
However, as this Article shows, a transitional perspective is necessary to 
make sense of American race jurisprudence.73 A polity committed to ridding 
itself of the vestiges of oppression requires an account of the past out of 
which it is emerging, the future it ought to pursue, the transition pathway 
between them, and the present stage of transition. Such a general theory is 
needed to make decisions about the legitimacy of various practices (what 
aspects of the past cannot be tolerated in the present?), to develop strategies 
(what is necessary to create a future distinct from the past?), and to 
determine progress (what of the past is safely behind and what is still 
present?).74 U.S. Supreme Court decisions shape and are shaped by such 
transitional theories, yet the transitional bases of decisions are rarely 
acknowledged and sometimes even denied. The task of this Article is to 
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tease out the existing theories of transition in racial equality opinions and to 
evaluate those theories in light of transitional justice insights.75 
Rereading race jurisprudence in light of more global transitional justice 
theory places American approaches in dialogue with international norms 
and debates. For example, transitional justice values, such as accountability, 
redress, non-repetition, and reconciliation, have been considered crucial in 
other societies struggling to recover from conflict and oppression. 76 
Understanding how these values are taken up in U.S. Supreme Court 
opinions is important because inadequate treatment of transitional concerns 
may be one reason why the United States has struggled to surmount racism. 
In addition to pursuing these values, transitional justice processes grapple 
with dilemmas that are endemic to periods of transition. One classic 
example is the “peace versus justice dilemma,”77 which transitional justice 
approaches address by seeking to “reconcile legitimate claims for justice 
with equally legitimate claims for stability and social peace . . . .” 78 
Recognizing transitional dilemmas is important because opinions resolving 
these dilemmas reveal judicial priorities such as alleviating white 
resentment over minority frustration,79 or taking a “non-accusatory” stance 
over working toward accountability.80  
 
75. The international field of transitional justice has paid little attention to the United States, 
despite the involvement of U.S.-based actors living in the aftermath of the Civil Rights Movement. Since 
its inception, the field has been more concerned with transitions to democracy—such as in Argentina 
and Chile as they emerged from dictatorships—than with transformations within “established” 
democracies. Affirmative Action as Transitional Justice, supra note 22, at 4. These features of 
transitional justice, coupled with a general reluctance to apply international human rights standards to 
the United States and to discuss U.S. civil rights as human rights, have further contributed to the 
underutilization of transitional frameworks in the United States. See Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human 
Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111 YALE L.J. 1935, 1947 (2002); CAROL ANDERSON, EYES OFF 
THE PRIZE: THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE AFRICAN AMERICAN STRUGGLE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, 1944–
1955 (2003). This is unfortunate because insights from transitional justice can benefit the pursuit of 
racial transition in the United States. Transitional justice demonstrates that the centuries-long oppression 
of Black Americans is precisely the kind of massive human rights violation that necessitates systematic 
and ongoing redress. Moreover, it places the United States alongside other countries that have taken, or 
are in the process of taking, steps to address historical legacies of oppression. See Does Transitional 
Justice Belong in the United States?, supra note 22. 
76. See supra notes 17–21; see also Bronwyn Anne Leebaw, The Irreconcilable Goals of 
Transitional Justice, 30 HUM. RTS. Q. 95, 98 (2008); Jon Elster, Justice, Truth, Peace, 51 NOMOS 78 
(2012). 
77. For an introduction to the peace versus justice dilemma, see Chandra Lekha Sriram, Justice 
as Peace? Liberal Peacebuilding and Strategies of Transitional Justice, 21 GLOBAL SOC’Y 579 (2007) 
and Cecilia Albin, Peace Versus Justice—and Beyond, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF CONFLICT 
RESOLUTION 580–594 (Jacob Bercovitch, Victor Kremenyuk & I. William Zartman eds., 2008). 
78. How “Transitions” Reshaped Human Rights, supra note 74, at 323. 
79. I develop a fuller account of America’s peace versus justice dilemmas in other work. See 
Yuvraj Joshi, Racial Justice and Peace, 110 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2022) [hereinafter Racial Justice 
and Peace]. 
80. Memorandum from Chief Justice Earl Warren to the Members of the United States Supreme 
Court (May 7, 1954) (suggesting that the Brown opinion should be “above all, non-accusatory”). 











Engagement with transitional justice generates many new insights about 
American race jurisprudence. For example, transitional justice highlights 
the interplay between individual laws and policies as elements of an 
integrated transition process.81 Not only has the U.S. Supreme Court failed 
to adopt such an approach, it has actively impeded an integrated transition 
process, for example, by striking down policies designed to address the 
relationship between residential and educational segregation. Likewise, 
given transitional justice’s emphasis on historical and collective memory,82 
it is important to consider how the Supreme Court remembers (and 
misremembers) history—what it passively overlooks and what it actively 
chooses to forget. This analysis points to the Court’s limited recognition of 
America’s racist history and its role in perpetuating America’s “unmastered 
past” as impediments to transition.83 
The transitional justice-inflected approach developed in this Article thus 
gives visibility to a broader range of considerations that shape race 
jurisprudence, while also shedding light on the particular and limited ways 
in which the Supreme Court has understood transition. Using this approach, 
scholars of racial discrimination can undertake a more multifaceted and 
internationally contextualized analysis of race decisions. At the same time, 
scholars of transitional justice can apply their concerns, which are typically 
directed at government interventions, to a jurisprudential analysis. 
2. Objections to a Transitional Analysis 
Despite these benefits, some readers might object to this Article’s 
transitional analysis of American society and jurisprudence.84 In regard to 
American society, one potential objection may consider a transitional 
analysis inapposite because the United States is an “established” 
democracy. 85  For example, some scholars like Eric Posner and Adrian 
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mechanisms”); Tricia D. Olsen, Leigh A. Payne & Andrew G. Reiter, The Justice Balance: When 
Transitional Justice Improves Human Rights and Democracy, 32 HUM. RTS. Q. 980, 982 (2010) 
(empirically analyzing transitional justice mechanisms and “how they work in tandem” to promote 
democracy and human rights). 
82. How “Transitions” Reshaped Human Rights, supra note 74, at 357–59. 
83. See text accompanying infra notes 422–424. 
84. Some of this discussion was excerpted and published elsewhere prior to the publication of 
this Article. See Does Transitional Justice Belong in the United States?, supra note 22. 
85. Lundy & McGovern, supra note 23, at 273 (“transition” tends to be understood as transition 
to democracy); How “Transitions” Reshaped Human Rights, supra note 74, at 322, 325 (tracing the 












Vermeule classify the United States as a “nontransitional societ[y],” even 
as they recognize that “consolidated liberal democracies” (such as the 
United States) “must deal with the problems of their own, albeit smaller-
scale, transitions.” 86  Yet, if even “consolidated” democracies undergo 
transitions, it is a misnomer to continue to classify them as 
“nontransitional.” 
This posture rests on both an overestimation of American democracy and 
an underestimation of the transition process: Democracy in the United 
States is not as “established” as commonly assumed, democratization is an 
ongoing rather than a one-time process, and transition is more than the 
maintenance of a democratic regime.  
Claims that emphasize the United States’ status as an “established” 
democracy ignore the denial of basic political rights and representation 
during slavery, up through Jim Crow, and into the present day.87 Writers 
from W. E. B. Du Bois to Nikole Hannah-Jones have argued that the United 
States was not a real democracy before Black people moved it toward 
becoming one.88 These arguments highlight how American democracy has 
been—and remains—incomplete, given the nation’s lack of racial justice.  
The incomplete nature of American democracy is evident when 
considering two tiers of liberal democracy: “restricted” democracy and 
“full” democracy. In a 2004 article, political scientists Francisco González 
and Desmond King drew this distinction and characterized the United States 
as a “restricted” democracy prior to the implementation of the 1964 Civil 
Rights Act and the 1965 Voting Rights Act.89 Weakened civil and voting 
 
86. Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Transitional Justice as Ordinary Justice, 117 HARV. L. 
REV. 762, 769, 823 (2004). 
87. For instance, in May 2020, a federal judge entered a permanent injunction against a Florida 
law that required people with serious criminal convictions to pay court fines as a condition for registering 
to vote, calling it “[a] tax by any other name.” Jones v. DeSantis, 462 F. Supp. 3d 1196, 1234 (N.D. Fla. 
2020). In July 2020, the Eleventh Circuit stayed the permanent injunction pending appeal, and the 
Supreme Court refused to vacate the stay, allowing Florida to enforce the law. Raysor v. DeSantis, 140 
S. Ct. 2600 (2020). 
88. DU BOIS, supra note 4; Nikole Hannah-Jones, The 1619 Project, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Aug. 
14, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/08/14/magazine/1619-america-slavery.html [http 
s://perma.cc/F6A3-ARDR]. 
89. Francisco E. González & Desmond King, The State and Democratization: The United States 
in Comparative Perspective, 34 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 193, 194 (2004). Pointing to the barriers that Black 
voters faced in Alabama in 1963, Dr. King similarly asked in his letter from Birmingham Jail: “Can any 
law enacted under such circumstances be considered democratically structured?” Martin Luther King, 
Jr., Letter from Birmingham Jail, 26 U.C. DAVIS. L. REV. 835, 841 (1993) [hereinafter Birmingham Jail]. 
Consistent with this transition from “restricted” to “full” democracy, scholars have referred to 
periods of major racial change in American history using terms indicative of regime change. For 
instance, historian Eric Foner and others have framed the Reconstruction era as America’s “second 
founding.” Foner, supra note 5. Political scientist Andrew Valls describes the Civil Rights era as a 
“regime transition” that “was woefully incomplete, and therefore unjust.” Valls, supra note 27, at 71. 
See generally BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION (2014) (tracing 
how the Civil Rights Movement transformed the U.S. Constitution). 











rights and broader racial authoritarianism likely render the United States of 
today something less than a “full” democracy.90 
An enduring feature of Black oppression in the United States has been a 
backsliding away from democracy. Transition is thus better conceptualized 
as the maintenance of democratic rule rather than only the attainment of a 
democratic regime.91 This understanding is reflected in the “preclearance” 
requirement of the Voting Rights Act, which prevents public officials from 
using discriminatory voting practices on a continuous basis, thus supporting 
transition by sustaining democratic rule.92 
Transition is not only a move toward democracy and the rule of law, but 
also charts a path toward peace and justice.93 In his letter from Birmingham 
Jail, Dr. King expressly called for “transition from an obnoxious negative 
peace . . . to a substantive and positive peace, in which all men will respect 
the dignity and worth of human personality.”94 Recurring protests against 
police violence and structural racism indict the government’s failures to 
secure such a substantive and positive peace. Civil rights leader Bayard 
Rustin’s warning to New York City mayor Robert Wagner rings as true 
today as it did in 1965: “[E]ither you creatively meet the causes of 
discontent in spring, or negatively face another long, hot summer.”95 This 
warning reminds us of the need to target our transitional efforts not only at 
American democracy, but at racial justice.96 
 
90. See generally CAROL ANDERSON, ONE PERSON, NO VOTE: HOW VOTER SUPPRESSION IS 
DESTROYING OUR DEMOCRACY (2018); Vesla M. Weaver & Gwen Prowse, Racial Authoritarianism in 
U.S. Democracy, SCI. MAG. (Sep. 4, 2020), https://science.sciencemag.org/content/369/6508/1176. 
91. Fionnuala Ní Aoláin & Colm Campbell, The Paradox of Transition in Conflicted 
Democracies, 27 HUM. RTS. Q. 172, 212 (2005) (describing transition under a pre-existing democratic 
framework as “a deepening, rather than an introduction, of democratic standards”). 
92. See infra Part II.C. 
93. See generally Racial Justice and Peace, supra note 79. 
94. Birmingham Jail, supra note 89, at 842 (emphasis added). 
95. BAYARD RUSTIN, I MUST RESIST: BAYARD RUSTIN’S LIFE IN LETTERS 304 (Michael G. Long 
ed., 2012). 
96. Others might object to a transitional analysis of the United States on the basis that either “too 
much” or “too little” has changed since America’s racial apartheid. From a “too much has changed” 
perspective, it does not make sense to consider the period from the First or Second Reconstruction to the 
present day as a single transition—because too much time has passed or there have been too many 
intervening events. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 292 (1978); Shelby 
Cty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 547 (2013). This perspective risks overstating the changes and understating 
the continuities between America’s racial past and present. No one claims that the United States of today 
is exactly the same as the antebellum or Jim Crow United States; the question that needs to be addressed 
is what legacies of the wrongful past are still present in today’s society. 
The passage of significant time since slavery and Jim Crow has not rendered questions of racial 
transition obsolete. Countries spanning from Canada to the Philippines have taken centuries to grapple 
with the legacies of their past. For instance, Canada’s 2008 Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
reached back to the Residential Schools of the 1860s, established to “aggressively assimilate” 
Indigenous children into Euro-Canadian culture; the mandate of Burundi’s 2014 Truth and 













In regard to American jurisprudence, a second potential objection may 
be that judges’ opinions are guided by law rather than theories of transition. 
However, even judges who present their reasoning as non-transitional (not 
concerned with transition)97 or anti-transitional (against a transition project 
or judicial involvement in it)98 ground arguments in the circumstances and 
needs of a society in transition. Often, these same judges articulate their own 
transitional visions to explain why certain measures should not be 
permitted.99  
Conversely, other readers may object that if judges already have their 
own local theories of transition, there is no need for “transitional justice” as 
an external framework or field. However, there is value in undertaking a 
partly immanent and partly external critique of legal opinions, evaluating 
race jurisprudence based both on its own logic and the perspective of 
transitional justice.  
The U.N. Special Rapporteur on racism, E. Tendayi Achiume, counsels 
looking beyond the United States for guidance because “international 
human rights norms require and offer the foundation for a better system than 
the one currently in place in this country.”100 Achiume calls for “push[ing] 
back against the sort of exceptionalism that implicitly treats existing 
domestic law as a high watermark for achieving justice and equality, when 
this law falls short even of global human rights anti-racism standards . . . 
 
Commission went back to the start of colonialism in 1638; the Commission on the Truth of Black Slavery 
in Brazil reached back to the Atlantic slave trade era in the 1500s; and the Philippines’ Framework 
Agreement on the Bangsamoro and Transitional Justice and Reconciliation Commission reached back 
to pre-1521 colonization. Until the United States takes adequate steps to address legacies of racism, its 
transition will be delayed as harms compound and past progress is erased. Truth & Reconciliation 
Comm’n of Can., Our Mandate, http://www.trc.ca/about-us/our-mandate.html [https://perma.cc/PW28-
RFL8] (Canada); Beatrice Tesconi, Burundi extends the mandate of the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission to cover crimes since 1885, ICL MEDIA REV. (Oct. 31, 2018, 8:19 PM), http://www.iclmedi 
areview.com/31-october-2018-burundi-extends-the-mandate-of-the-truth-andreconciliation-commissio 
n-to-cover-crimes-since-1885 [https://perma.cc/34HE-RPWJ] (Burundi); Rep. of Truth & 
Reconciliation Comm’n (2011), http://pmo.govmu.org/English/Documents/TJC_Vol1.pdf [https://perm 
a.cc/R6GY-PGQH] (Mauritius); Márcia Leitão Pinheiro, A Truth Commission in Brazil: Slavery, 
Multiculturalism, History and Memory, 18 CIVITAS-REVISTA DE CIÊNCIAS SOCIAIS 683 (2018) (Brazil); 
Kristian Herbolzheimer, The Peace Process in Mindanao, the Philippines: Evolution and Lessons 
Learned, INT’L REL. SEC. NET. 17 (2015) (Philippines). 
From a “too little has changed” perspective, the language of transition (like that of change or 
progress) obscures continuities with the past and implies structural change where it does not truly exist. 
From this vantage point, calling the U.S. transitional is a misnomer because it suggests that American 
society is moving beyond its racist past, when it is really continuing or repeating the past. This “too little 
has changed” perspective reminds us that racial transition encompasses both discontinuity and 
continuity, both steps forward and back. In so doing, it cautions us against letting the former eclipse the 
latter in our collective understanding of transition. Indeed, one of the main reasons to undertake a 
transitional analysis is precisely to reconcile the various breaks from and continuities with the past.  
97. See, e.g., Bakke, 438 U.S. at 298.  
98. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 378 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting).  
99. See text accompanying infra notes 249–254.  
100. Achiume, supra note 32. 











.”101 Achiume’s assessment suggests that the local theories that have been 
governing American race jurisprudence may be inadequate. In addition to 
offering the kind of independent perspective that is needed to assess local 
theories of transition, transitional justice provides a framework for aligning 
local approaches with international human rights norms. By situating what 
judges are doing within a transitional justice framework, we can better 
understand the limitations of their approaches and look for alternate modes 
of response. 
Some Americans may resist an external field that embraces different 
approaches than those adopted by the United States or reveals this country 
to be still ‘developing’ in ways that place it alongside or behind others 
perceived as ‘less developed.’102 However, given the value of a transitional 
justice framework, engaging with it is worthwhile even in the presence of 
local theories of transition and even where this engagement involves the 
discomfort of viewing the United States in an international context. 103 
Unsettling beliefs about American democracy and exceptionalism may be 
necessary for racial and other justice struggles. International comparisons 
have helped the pursuit of racial justice in the past104 and may do so again 
as the United States seeks to restore its image on the world stage.105 
This Part has begun to examine the United States in transitional terms. 
Building on this foundation, the next Part of this Article undertakes a 
transitional analysis of American race jurisprudence. 
II. TRANSITION AND RACE JURISPRUDENCE 
Race jurisprudence is said to be “a jurisprudence of fragmentation” 
partly because it compartmentalizes types of cases involving race and 
applies different doctrinal strategies to them. 106  However, certain 
transitional frames operate across decisions and bodies of law. In analyzing 
opinions concerning school desegregation, voting rights, affirmative action, 
and disparate impact, this Part foregrounds the opinions’ understandings of 
the racial past out of which the nation has been emerging, the racial future 
 
101. Id. 
102. See generally VICKI JACKSON, CONSTITUTIONAL ENGAGEMENT IN A TRANSNATIONAL ERA 
77 (2013) (discussing how foreign comparisons express national identity).  
103. Rebecca Hamilton, If We Could See Ourselves from the Outside, JUST SEC. (June 4, 2020), 
https://www.justsecurity.org/70576/if-we-could-see-ourselves-from-the-outside/ [https://perma.cc/6N 
N8-GVFQ]. 
104. DUDZIAK, supra note 52, at 13 (“The story of race in America, used to compare democracy 
and communism, became an important Cold War narrative.”).  
105. Dorothy Wickenden, Can Joe Biden Repair America’s Reputation Abroad?, NEW YORKER 
(Dec. 3, 2020), https://www.newyorker.com/podcast/political-scene/can-joe-biden-repair-americas-rep 
utation-abroad. 
106. Rachel F. Moran, Rethinking Race, Equality, and Liberty: The Unfulfilled Promise of Parents 












it ought to pursue, the transition pathway between them, and the present 
stage of transition.107 
This analysis reveals that the Supreme Court has sought racial transition 
in two main ways—reckoning with and distancing from the past. In the Civil 
Rights era, the Court recognized that addressing centuries of racial 
discrimination would take active steps and a significant amount of time.108 
However, the civil rights retrenchment and conservative appointments 
starting in the late 1960s shifted the Court’s approach away from reckoning 
with historic wrongs. Civil rights law once considered necessary for 
grappling with the past was curtailed in the name of getting over the past.  
Exploring transitional arguments that have shaped racial equality 
opinions until now sheds light on future arguments. Conservative opinions 
in several recent cases have employed transitional reasoning to justify 
dramatic changes. The Roberts Court struck down school desegregation and 
voting rights measures on the basis that they are no longer necessary or 
appropriate; only Justice Kennedy’s decisive votes kept affirmative action 
and disparate impact measures alive. With the retirement of Justice 
Kennedy and the passing of Justice Ginsburg, the Court could deploy 
transitional narratives that even more drastically limit civil rights 
protections in the name of achieving a better racial future. 
A. Distancing and Reckoning Frameworks 
Although the original distancing and reckoning frameworks developed 
in this Article are derived from the cases themselves, they echo a key debate 
within transitional justice. Should societies attempt to “close the book” on 
their traumatic pasts or should they “reckon with past wrongs”?109 In closing 
the book, some societies strive to put the past behind them, on the belief that 
too much memory of the past may be destabilizing for the transition 
 
107. While transitional reasoning structures a large number of these opinions, this discussion 
prioritizes paradigmatic opinions that most clearly reflect the transitional imperative, as well as 
predictive opinions that shed light on the future trajectory of transitional jurisprudence. The opinions 
discussed here are both illustrative and constitutive of transition; they offer a window into how 
transitional concerns shape the law and how the law shapes the transition process. 
108. Even so, the Warren Court’s race reckoning had limitations. See Sumi Cho, Redeeming 
Whiteness in the Shadow of Internment: Earl Warren, Brown, and a Theory of Racial Redemption, 40 
B.C. L. REV. 73 (1998); Justin Driver, The Constitutional Conservatism of the Warren Court, 100 CALIF. 
L. REV. 1101, 1130–39 (2012); see also infra notes 347–350. 
109. Mark Arenhövel, Democratization and Transitional Justice, 15 DEMOCRATIZATION 570, 572 
(2008) (describing transitional justice responses ranging from “a resurrection of the past on the one hand, 
to unconditionally ‘closing the book’ and collective amnesia on the other”); HENNIE VAN VUUREN, 
APARTHEID GRAND CORRUPTION: ASSESSING THE SCALE OF CRIMES OF PROFIT IN SOUTH AFRICA FROM 
1976 TO 1994, 86–87 (2006) (distinguishing between options to “close the book on the past” and 
“forthrightly engage with the past”). See generally MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND 
FORGIVENESS: FACING HISTORY AFTER GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE 4 (1998). 











process.110  In reckoning with wrongs, societies aim to address the long 
shadow of history, with the understanding that too much forgetting may 
yield an incomplete or inadequate transition process.111  
Distancing corresponds with “closing the book” by relegating racism to 
a remote and irrelevant past. In this approach, racial transition involves a 
repudiation of past racial wrongdoing and a refusal to allow it to have 
authority over present life; transition is achieved once past racist policies 
have been eliminated from today’s world. Because distancing aims to create 
a disjuncture between past and present society, it views too much 
association with past injustices as an impediment to transition. 112  Civil 
rights law carries the risk of entrenching past conflict by pursuing remedies 
long after the original perpetrators and victims are gone. 
Reckoning seeks to confront racism’s enduring and evolving legacies. 
According to this view, racial transition involves both recognition and 
remediation of centuries of racial violence and their longer-term 
consequences for society; transition is complete not when past racist 
policies are discontinued, but when white supremacist structures and 
ideologies no longer taint the present or threaten the future. Because 
reckoning aims to address the linkages between past and present society, it 
views too much disregard for past injustices or failure to recognize historical 
continuities as threats to transition. Civil rights law is needed to address 
pernicious legacies and features of the previous regime that have persisted 
in an altered form. 
Distancing and reckoning are therefore about the relationship that a 
transitioning United States should have with its white supremacist history. 
Generally speaking, distancing analyses clearly demarcate a post-
 
110. CATHERINE O’ROURKE, GENDER POLITICS IN TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 58 (2013) (“Demands 
to ‘look to the future’ and to ‘move on’ and ‘close the book’ on harms of the past are potent in contexts 
in which the past is deemed difficult, divisive and potentially destabilising to a transition.”); Azanian 
Peoples Org. v. President of the Republic of S. Afr., 1996 (4) SA 672 (CC) at 674 (S. Afr.) (“It was 
realised that much of the unjust consequences of the past could not ever be fully reversed. It might be 
necessary in crucial areas to close the book on that past.”); VAN VUUREN, supra note 109, at 3 (“[Closing] 
the book on the past . . . will, however, probably always haunt us as a society.”). 
111. David A. Crocker, Reckoning with Past Wrongs: A Normative Framework, 13 ETHICS & 
INT’L AFF. 43 (1999) (discussing “ethical issues that emerge in reckoning with past wrongs”); Alexandra 
Barahona De Brito, Carmen González Enríquez & Paloma Aguilar, Introduction to THE POLITICS OF 
MEMORY: TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN DEMOCRATIZING SOCIETIES 2 (Alexandra Barahona De Brito, 
Carmen González Enríquez & Paloma Aguilar eds., 2001) (discussing “the significance of forms of 
reckoning with the past for a process of democratization or democratic deepening”). 
112. Various normative, political, and psychological concerns might underlie such a distancing 
approach to transition. Those eager to disassociate the present from the past may genuinely consider 
doing so the most promising path forward. They may believe that injustice has already been overcome 
or cannot be overcome with state action. They may be invested in removing “extraordinary” transitional 
practices (such as affirmative action and voter protections) and restoring an “ordinary” status quo that 
they consider more beneficial. They may also experience resistance or fatigue in the face of a transition 












transitional present from the past, and thus see only a limited set of 
transitional policies as appropriate. Meanwhile, reckoning analyses see 
enduring and evolving legacies of the past in the present, and so believe in 
the necessity of a more expansive transition project. Embedded in these 
approaches are different understandings of when transition is complete, 
what harms it should address, over what time horizon, and through what 
means.  
Completed vs. pending transition.—Distancing analyses insist that 
because overt Jim Crow-style practices are no longer prevalent, a transition 
from one age to another has occurred and injustice overcome. 113  Any 
discrimination and disadvantage minorities face today are unrelated to 
historic practices and therefore outside the scope of transition; all requisite 
reckoning is already complete.114 By contrast, reckoning analyses recognize 
that racist structures and practices have endured—even if they may appear 
different in some instances—such that transition is incomplete and 
necessitates continued attention.115 
Episodic vs. continuous transition.—Distancing analyses emphasize 
discontinuity between past racist episodes and present racial disparities, 
such that remedies from the past ought to be divorced from present-day 
laws. 116  Reckoning analyses instead recognize that forms of racial 
oppression are not neatly bounded in time and earlier remedies may be 
needed to address the root causes of present-day problems. Reckoning 
opinions underscore continuities between past and present forms of racism 
that may appear different, because it is difficult to “completely escape[] the 
grip of a historical legacy spanning centuries,” 117  and because “history 
repeats itself.”118  
Temporary vs. enduring transition.—Distancing analyses define 
transition as a short, temporary process that has a clear end point and are 
 
113. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 547, 552 (2013) (stating that “[n]early 50 years later, 
things have changed dramatically” and “history did not end in 1965”). 
114. Id. at 536 (conceding that “voting discrimination still exists” while striking down key 
provisions of the Voting Rights Act). 
115. Id. at 592 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that “history repeats itself”); McCleskey v. 
Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 344 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (refusing to “pretend that in three decades we 
have completely escaped the grip of a historical legacy spanning centuries”). 
116. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 756 (2007) 
(Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that “the further we get from the era of state-sponsored racial 
separation, the less likely it is that racial imbalance has a traceable connection to any prior segregation”); 
City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 74 (1980) (once a demonstrable link between the past and the 
present attenuates, “past discrimination cannot, in the manner of original sin, condemn governmental 
action that is not itself unlawful.”); Columbus Board of Education v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 491 (1979) 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (worrying that desegregation remedies would “render all school systems 
captives of a remote and ambiguous past”).  
117. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 344 (Brennan, J., dissenting).  
118. Shelby Cty., 570 U.S. at 592 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  











critical of transitional measures that might operate “in perpetuity.” 119 
Reckoning analyses propose a more enduring transition process that may 
not have a clear end-date;120 ongoing measures are necessary for extirpating 
entrenched legacies, “preventing retrogression,”121 and tackling “[s]econd-
generation barriers” to racial equality that “come in various forms.”122  
Isolated vs. coordinated strategies.—Distancing approaches isolate 
racism to particular practices and institutions while disregarding racism that 
operates across multiple sites to produce systemic disadvantage, 123  for 
example, by refusing to address linkages between residential and 
educational segregation patterns. 124  Taking a more expansive view, 
 
119. Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 248 (1991); Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. 
Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 226 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) 
(rejecting ongoing preventative measures because “[p]unishment for long past sins is not a legitimate 
basis for imposing a forward-looking preventative measure . . . .”). 
120. Dowell, 498 U.S. at 267 n.11 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (rejecting a preoccupation with the 
“temporariness and permanence” of transitional measures).  
121. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 806 (2007) (Breyer, 
J., dissenting).  
122. Shelby Cty., 570 U.S. at 563 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Although this argument is not directly 
made in racial equality cases, enduring measures may also be necessary to manage what Derrick Bell 
termed “the permanence of racism.” DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE 
PERMANENCE OF RACISM (1993); Derrick Bell, Racism is Here to Stay: Now What?, 35 HOW. L.J. 79 
(1991). Robert Meister similarly describes “transitional time” as a time “of indefinite duration, 
potentially permanent . . . .” MEISTER, supra note 27, at 85. Monica Bell proposes “a perpetual 
governance process” to address racialized policing given “the phoenix-like resilience of institutional 
racism . . . .” Monica C. Bell, Anti-Segregation Policing, 95 N.Y.U. L. REV. 650, 744, 763 (2020). 
Even where reckoning and distancing opinions agree that transitional measures should ideally be 
temporary (as with affirmative action), there are disparate political and practical motivations for 
underscoring the temporariness of transition. For those invested in remedying racial oppression, 
temporariness expresses an aspiration that justice must be achieved sooner rather than later; it perhaps 
also reflects a belief that a community (or powerful forces within it) will allow remedies for historical 
injustice only if those remedies are limited in time. By contrast, for those invested in restoring an 
“ordinary” status quo, temporariness suggests that transitional laws ought to be terminated because the 
precise problems that caused them to be enacted have been solved (rendering remedies unnecessary) or 
because too much time has passed since historical injustice (rendering remedies inappropriate). No one 
has more at stake in making transition temporary than those who feel disfavored by transitional practices 
and seek to restore a status quo they consider more beneficial. Owen M. Fiss, Gaston County v. United 
States: Fruition of the Freezing Principle, 1969 SUP. CT. REV. 379, 433 (1969) (“Part of the pressure in 
society to forget the past no doubt generates from either those who discriminated or those who have little 
or nothing to gain from the correction of past discrimination.”). 
Temporariness may also be appealing because time appears more impartial than other criteria for 
ending transitional measures, and setting a duration for transition may enable compromise between 
actors who disagree about the purpose and path of transition. See generally ELIZABETH F. COHEN, THE 
POLITICAL VALUE OF TIME: CITIZENSHIP, DURATION, AND DEMOCRATIC JUSTICE 97–119 (2018). 
However, temporary transitions may be unrealistically short and fail to achieve necessary changes, 
encouraging narrow interpretations of wrongs and remedies and the pursuit of reductive rather than 
transformative goals. 
123. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307 (rejecting affirmative action aimed at redressing “societal 
discrimination”). 
124. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974); Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. 
Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 711–712 (2009). See generally Cary Franklin, Separate Spheres, 123 YALE 
L.J. 2878, 2883 (2014) (describing “interspherical impacts” as “the cumulative effects of disadvantage 












reckoning approaches trace the effects of racism across different social 
institutions and spheres such as education and housing.125 In turn, reckoning 
opinions advocate for coordinated and cross-cutting solutions.126 
Perfect vs. imperfect strategies.—Distancing approaches tend to demand 
perfection of transitional measures and weigh the costs of imperfections 
heavily based on assumptions of a just world.127 Demands for perfection 
sometimes take doctrinal form, for example, through requirements that 
transitional measures be precisely aligned with their stated goals.128 On the 
other hand, reckoning approaches contend that perfect solutions are 
unrealistic when transitioning from a deeply flawed world,129 and imperfect 
strategies are necessary for the real-world pursuit of transition.130  
Non-interventionist vs. interventionist strategies.—Distancing 
approaches argue that a government that once discriminated on the basis of 
race should not create race-sensitive policy, even if that policy is anti-
racist.131  Non-interventionism is frequently justified on the grounds that 
existing race-sensitive strategies have “already served [their] purpose”132 
and will now “do more harm than good.”133 Reckoning approaches urge 
positive countering of racial disparities on the belief that race-sensitive 
policies that achieve racial equity are necessary to address deep-seated 
legacies and avoid repeating the past.134 
 
125. Milliken, 418 U.S. at 802 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (courts “cannot ignore the white-flight 
problem” in addressing school segregation). 
126. Id. at 803–14 (detailing the problems with a “Detroit-only” desegregation decree). 
127. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 291–92 (subjecting affirmative action for underrepresented minorities to 
“the most exacting judicial examination” on the assumption that it is “no longer possible to peg the 
guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment to the struggle for equality of one racial minority”). 
128. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher I), 570 U.S. 297, 311 (2013) (detailing narrow 
tailoring requirements for affirmative action); Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 542–45 (2013) 
(criticizing the Voting Rights Act’s coverage formula for not “accurately” reflecting the covered 
jurisdictions). 
129. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 14 (1971) (the Court taking upon 
itself to “amplify guidelines, however incomplete and imperfect”). 
130. Id. at 28 (recognizing that “all awkwardness and inconvenience cannot be avoided”).  
131. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 378 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  
132. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 226 (2009) (Thomas, J., 
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).  
133. Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 572 U.S. 291, 315 (2014) (Roberts, C.J., 
concurring). 
134. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 401–02 (Marshall, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part) (“If we are ever to become a fully integrated society . . . we must be willing to 
take steps to open those doors.”); id. at 407 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“In 
order to get beyond racism, we must first take account of race.”); Schuette, 572 U.S. at 381 (Sotomayor, 
J., dissenting) (“The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to speak openly and candidly on 
the subject of race . . . .”). 











Keeping these dichotomies in mind within an overarching framework 
comparing distancing and reckoning is useful for understanding Supreme 
Court cases in four areas.135  
B. School Desegregation 
More than any others, school desegregation cases reason in explicitly 
transitional terms that have shifted over time. Earlier cases identified 
segregation as a historical and ongoing wrong to be reckoned with through 
integration in public life. These decisions endorsed race-based measures as 
means to transition to integrated school systems, even if those measures 
were imperfect and disrupted existing white norms. However, more recent 
cases have cast segregation as a problem of the past and declared transition 
complete. These cases have questioned race-based strategies aimed at 
integration, insisting on proof of both explicit segregative policies and the 
direct necessity of integrative solutions.  
The landmark 1954 decision in Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka 
declared racial segregation in public education unconstitutional.136 When 
segregationists launched a “massive resistance” to Brown and school 
desegregation, Brown II a year later had to explain how the transition 
mandated in Brown would be achieved. 137  Courts would assess the 
adequacy of local plans “to effectuate a transition to a racially 
nondiscriminatory school system” and would have jurisdiction over 
desegregation cases “[d]uring this period of transition.”138 However, Brown 
II said that Brown shall be implemented only “with all deliberate speed,”139 
an ambiguous phrase that paved the way for further resistance to 
integration.140 
After Arkansas state officials refused to abide by Brown, a unanimous 
opinion in Cooper v. Aaron in 1958 held that state officials must begin 
desegregating the state’s public schools. 141  Rejecting a school board’s 
proposal to reverse and postpone desegregation in order to maintain “public 
peace,” the Supreme Court concluded that “law and order are not here to be 
 
135. Although these two perspectives do not capture the entire universe of transitional concerns, 
and although some opinions reason from both distancing and reckoning perspectives to justify or critique 
existing civil rights measures, these common understandings of distancing and reckoning serve as useful 
frameworks to analyze racial equality opinions.  
136. 347 U.S. 483, 483 (1954).  
137. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294, 299 (1955).  
138. Id. at 301.  
139. Id.  
140. CHARLES J. OGLETREE, ALL DELIBERATE SPEED: REFLECTIONS ON THE FIRST HALF-
CENTURY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION (2004).  












preserved by depriving the Negro children of their constitutional rights.”142 
Justice Frankfurter, concurring, recognized that although racial reckoning 
would stir “[d]eep emotions,” those emotions ought not to stop transition 
processes.143 He forecasted a transition process in which “local habits and 
feelings will yield, gradually though this be, to law and education.” 144 
Overall, Cooper made clear that steps toward justice via racial reckoning 
were not to be delayed in the name of racial peace.145  
Desegregation decisions from the late 1960s through the early 1970s 
continued to expound the requirements of racial reckoning.146 In 1968, a 
unanimous Court in Green v. County School Board of New Kent County said 
that a “freedom of choice plan,” which allowed all students in a deeply 
segregated county to choose their school, was insufficient for “transition to 
a unitary, nonracial system of public education . . . .”147 New Kent County 
had not satisfied its “affirmative duty” to eliminate racial discrimination 
“root and branch,” 148  and needed to propose “a plan that promises 
realistically to work, and promises realistically to work now.” 149  In so 
holding, Green highlighted the need for transitional measures to be both 
effective and timely in order to meet judicial standards. 
Perhaps a high-water mark of reckoning jurisprudence was the 1971 
decision in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education.150 The 
period of racial reckoning following Brown had disrupted settled 
expectations and provoked resistance to change. As the unanimous opinion 
recognized: “Nothing in our national experience prior to 1955 prepared 
anyone for dealing with changes and adjustments of the magnitude and 
complexity encountered since then.”151 To help school systems and courts 
navigate these transitional dynamics, the Court took upon itself the 
responsibility to “amplify guidelines, however incomplete and 
imperfect . . . .”152  
Swann openly acknowledged that transitional practices aimed at 
integration may be imperfect; however, such imperfections were the 
 
142. Id. at 16.  
143. Id. at 25 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).  
144. Id.  
145. For a detailed transitional account of Cooper v. Aaron, see Racial Justice and Peace, supra 
note 79. 
146. J. Harvie Wilkinson, III, The Supreme Court and Southern School Desegregation, 1955–
1970: A History and Analysis, 64 VA. L. REV. 485, 486 (1978) (criticizing how “from 1955 to 1968 the 
Court abandoned the field of public school desegregation,” taking a “nonjurisprudential” role).  
147. 391 U.S. 430, 436 (1968).  
148. Id. at 437–38.  
149. Id. at 439. 
150. 402 U.S. 1, 1 (1971) (declaring that federal courts are constitutionally authorized to develop 
and oversee remedies for state-imposed segregation).  
151. Id. at 13.  
152. Id. at 14.  











unavoidable consequence of reckoning with the deeply flawed world of 
segregation: “[A]ll awkwardness and inconvenience cannot be avoided in 
the interim period when remedial adjustments are being made to eliminate 
the dual school systems.”153 In this way, Swann unanimously recognized 
that transitional measures did not have to be ideal in order to be valuable 
and worthwhile.154 
This unanimity broke with the arrival of William Rehnquist.155 In 1973, 
Keyes v. School District No. 1 held that a single segregated school in Denver 
was enough to suggest a “prima facie case of unlawful segregative design,” 
and the school board had the burden of proving that it operated without 
system-wide “segregative intent.”156 “Remoteness in time” since the school 
board’s actions was no excuse.157 Then-Justice Rehnquist, nominated to the 
Supreme Court by Richard Nixon shortly after Swann, dissented in Keyes.158 
He interpreted Brown in ways that would significantly limit desegregation 
efforts and soon become a dominant doctrinal view, as evidenced by the 
1974 case Milliken v. Bradley.159 
In Milliken, a 5-4 majority rejected a solution to desegregate both 
Detroit, which was two-thirds Black, and its suburbs, which were 
predominantly White. 160  The Court held that Brown did not allow 
interdistrict desegregation without an interdistrict violation; if suburban 
schools did not actively produce school segregation in Detroit, they did not 
have to promote integration. 161  Milliken thus treated the White Flight-
induced segregation that plagued Detroit in the 1970s as discontinuous from 
 
153. Id. at 28. 
154. However, Owen Fiss predicted future backsliding by noting that Swann’s rules “may be only 
transitional requirements.” Owen M. Fiss, The Charlotte-Mecklenburg Case—Its Significance for 
Northern School Desegregation, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 697, 703 (1971). 1997 survey data of over 1800 
Charlotte-Mecklenburg students revealed the negative effects of segregation on academic achievement, 
“even in an ostensibly desegregated school system . . . .” Roslyn Arlin Mickelson, Subverting Swann: 
First- and Second-Generation Segregation in the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Schools, 38 AM. EDUC. RES. 
J. 215, 215 (2001). 
155. For critical perspectives on Rehnquist’s race jurisprudence, see Paul Butler, Rehnquist, 
Racism, and Race Jurisprudence, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1019 (2006); Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., 
Understanding the Racial Discourse of Justice Rehnquist, 25 RUTGERS L.J. 597 (1994).  
156. Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 199, 208–09 (1973). Writing for a 7-1 majority, Justice 
Brennan defined segregated schools to include those with “a combined predominance of Negroes and 
Hispanos” in light of the shared “educational inequities” of those racial minorities relative to Whites. Id. 
at 197–98. This extended desegregation beyond an exclusively black-white binary paradigm to include 
other racialized groups. Rachel F. Moran, Untoward Consequences: The Ironic Legacy of Keyes v. 
School District No. 1, 90 DENV. U. L. REV. 1209, 1211 (2013) (describing the effects on Latinx people 
of “white and middle-class flight to the suburbs that took place in the wake of the Keyes desegregation 
order”). 
157. Keyes, 413 U.S. at 201–11.  
158. Id. at 254 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).  
159. 418 U.S. 717, 717 (1974).  
160. Id.; see Myron Orfield, Milliken, Meredith, and Metropolitan Segregation, 62 UCLA L. REV. 
363, 390–416, 430–38, 456–57 (2015) (discussing the Milliken litigation and its legacy). 












the Jim Crow segregation that Brown addressed in the 1950s. Milliken’s 
refusal to extend the ambit of racial reckoning beyond Brown cleared the 
way for racially and economically segregated neighborhoods and schools.162 
Of the five Justices in the majority, four were Nixon appointees. 
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Marshall called Milliken “a giant step 
backwards” that would hinder the transition mandated in Brown.163 “Our 
Nation, I fear, will be ill served by the court’s refusal to remedy separate 
and unequal education,” he cautioned, “for unless our children begin to 
learn together, there is little hope that our people will ever learn to live 
together.”164 Marshall’s warning came true: Detroit’s schools were even 
more segregated in 2019 than they were in 1974, a pattern that reappears in 
several cities.165 
Even with four Nixon appointees, the Supreme Court occasionally 
reasoned from reckoning. In 1979, for instance, Columbus Board of 
Education v. Penick recognized how one school board’s “conduct at the 
time of trial and before not only was animated by an unconstitutional, 
segregative purpose, but also had current, segregative impact . . . .”166 By 
contrast, Justice Rehnquist’s dissent portrayed the school board’s current 
conduct as historically discontinuous, warning that Penick would “render 
all school systems captives of a remote and ambiguous past.”167 
With additional Reagan and Bush appointees, an increasingly 
conservative Court acted more decisively to limit desegregation by 
separating present from past. In 1991, for instance, Board of Education of 
Oklahoma v. Dowell held that desegregation decrees were not to operate “in 
 
162. Id. at 717–20; see Charles R. Lawrence, III, Segregation “Misunderstood”: The Milliken 
Decision Revisited, 12 U.S.F. L. REV. 15, 16 (1977) (arguing that Milliken “assured middle-class whites 
that their mass exodus to the suburbs to seek refuge from blacks had not been made in vain” and “made 
clear that [the Court] would not use school desegregation to invade the suburban fortress of housing for 
whites only”). 
163. Milliken, 418 U.S. at 782 (Marshall, J., dissenting).  
164. Id. at 783.  
165. Dismissed: America’s Most Divisive School Board Districts, EDBUILD (July 2019), https://ed 
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disparate school funding decisions. In 2018, Sen. Chris Murphy and Rep. Marcia L. Fudge introduced 
the Strength in Diversity Act, which would create a grant program for the development and 
implementation of interdistrict integration efforts. See Equity and Inclusion Enforcement Act of 2019, 
H.R. 2574, 116th Cong. (2019); Strength in Diversity Act of 2020, H.R. 2639, 116th Cong. (2020). 
However, Donald Trump’s Secretary of Education Betsy DeVos cancelled a desegregation program 
from the Obama Administration and rescinded guidance on promoting racial diversity in schools, 
measures that the Biden Administration intends to restore. Erica L. Green, Biden’s Education 
Department Will Move Fast to Reverse Betsy DeVos’s Policies, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 13, 2020), https://ww 
w.nytimes.com/2020/11/13/us/politics/biden-education-devos.html [https://perma.cc/9WTT-BLL3]. 
166. 443 U.S. 449, 455 (1979); see Boddie, supra note 14, at 1835–44 (discussing temporal 
dimensions of Penick). 
167. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 491 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 











perpetuity,” regardless of whether they were needed.168 Now-Chief Justice 
Rehnquist interpreted references to “transition” in Brown II and Green to 
suggest “a temporary measure to remedy past discrimination” rather than 
something more enduring.169 Such insistence on time limits for transition 
were mirrored in affirmative action and voting rights cases.170  
Justice Marshall’s dissent rejected Dowell’s preoccupation with 
“temporariness and permanence” because “the continued need for a 
[desegregation] decree will turn on whether the underlying purpose of the 
decree has been achieved.”171 For Marshall, that purpose was not achieved 
“so long as conditions likely to inflict the stigmatic injury condemned in 
Brown I persist.”172 
The 2007 decision in Parents Involved v. Seattle captures the current 
distancing approach to school desegregation.173 A 5-4 majority invalidated 
student assignment plans in Louisville and Seattle that promoted integration 
by taking explicit account of a student’s race.174 
Writing for a plurality, Chief Justice Roberts declared that because 
Jefferson County in Kentucky had already implemented a mandatory 
desegregation plan until 2000, it had completed its transition to a unitary 
school system.175 Furthermore, because Seattle had never maintained an 
officially segregated school system (a contention that was disputed by the 
dissenting Justices), it could not employ a racial tiebreaker solely to address 
contemporary linkages between educational and residential segregation 
patterns.176 In other words, Louisville had already completed its reckoning 
with Jim Crow segregation, and Seattle never needed such reckoning in the 
first place.  
 
168. 498 U.S. 237, 248 (1991); see Kevin Brown, Has the Supreme Court Allowed the Cure for 
De Jure Segregation to Replicate the Disease?, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 21–25, 30–35 (1992) (discussing 
the Dowell litigation and its implications); Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, Resurrecting the Promise of 
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Schools, 88 N.C. L. REV. 787, 820–25, 829–30 (2010) (arguing that Dowell “reconstitutionalized 
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169. Dowell, 498 U.S. at 247.  
170. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 342 (2003); Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 546 
(2013).  
171. Dowell, 498 U.S. at 267 n.11 (Marshall, J., dissenting).  
172. Id. at 252.  
173. 551 U.S. 701, 701 (2007).  
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Confronting Extralegal Obstacles to Integration, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 1015 (2008) (recommending fusing 
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In both cases, Roberts felt that continuing race-based integration plans 
would impede racial transition, as “the ‘ultimate goal’ of ‘eliminating 
entirely from governmental decision-making such irrelevant factors as a 
human being’s race’ will never be achieved.” 177  Only absolute 
colorblindness would clearly demarcate the present from the past: “The way 
to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the 
basis of race,” he declared.178  
In a concurring opinion, Justice Thomas made distancing and reckoning 
arguments to reject Seattle’s and Louisville’s plans. From distancing, he 
argued that these practices were inappropriate because present 
circumstances could not be directly linked to prior discrimination. “[T]he 
further we get from the era of state-sponsored racial separation, the less 
likely it is that racial imbalance has a traceable connection to any prior 
segregation,” he asserted. 179  Transition had to be a “one-time process 
involving the redress of a discrete legal injury inflicted by an identified 
entity,” as opposed to “a continuous process with no identifiable culpable 
party and no discern[i]ble end point.”180 Furthermore, in contrast to most 
reckoning opinions, which support continued integration measures, Thomas 
argued that reckoning with America’s racist past should lead us to reject 
integration strategies. He likened contemporary integrationist arguments to 
the segregationist arguments put forth in Brown—a comparison he has 
repeated in other cases.181  
In a thirty-seven-page-long dissent, Justice Breyer criticized the plurality 
opinion’s rendering of the Seattle and Louisville plans.182 The transitional 
purpose of those plans, he argued, was not only “eradicating earlier school 
segregation,” but also “bringing about integration” and “preventing 
retrogression.”183 Moreover, Seattle, too, had “school board policies and 
actions that had helped to create, maintain, and aggravate racial 
segregation,” which the plurality opinion had overlooked in the absence of 
 
177. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 730 (quoting City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 
469, 495 (1989) (plurality opinion of O’Connor, J.)).  
178. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 748; see Erwin Chemerinsky, Making Schools More Separate 
and Unequal: Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 2014 MICH. ST. 
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schools in an environment where federal incentive to pursue desegregation is already lacking); Osamudia 
R. James, Opt-Out Education: School Choice as Racial Subordination, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1083, 1112–
13 (2014) (arguing that Parents Involved extinguishes hope for integration in public school settings and 
pushes toward school choice that retrenches segregation and exempts states from addressing racial 
inequality). 
179. Parents Involved, 55 U.S. at 756 (Thomas, J., concurring).  
180. Id. at 756–57.  
181. Id. at 748, 773–778; Fisher I, 570 U.S. 297, 323–24 (2013) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
182. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 803 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
183. Id. at 806. 











a judicial decree of desegregation. 184  Breyer’s opinion illustrated how 
casting historical racism in narrow, formalistic terms would yield a more 
contained and incomplete transition project. He worried that Parents 
Involved “announce[d] legal rules that [would] obstruct efforts by state and 
local governments to deal effectively with the growing resegregation of 
public schools,” thereby halting or reversing racial transition.185 
Staking a middle path, Justice Kennedy proposed an approach that may 
be termed reckoning while distancing. Kennedy agreed with the plurality 
opinion that school boards could not explicitly classify students by race 
unless necessary.186 However, he also questioned Chief Justice Roberts’ 
“all-too-unyielding insistence” against race-sensitive integration, 187 
recognizing that “[t]he enduring hope is that race should not matter; the 
reality is that too often it does.”188 Kennedy favored measures that would 
promote reckoning by reducing enduring segregation and distancing by 
reducing the legible importance of race.189  
While the Supreme Court has not taken a major school desegregation 
case since Parents Involved, that case has laid the groundwork for a future 
distancing jurisprudence. The Court may further limit legal pathways to 
integration by declaring that (1) present-day segregation is discontinuous 
from Jim Crow segregation such that it is beyond the scope of transition; (2) 
transition to non-discriminatory school systems is a one-time process that is 
already complete; and (3) integration efforts perpetuate racial classifications 
of the past and impede transition to a colorblind society. 
C. Voting Rights 
Passed after the historic marches from Selma to Montgomery, the 1965 
Voting Rights Act was enacted to remove barriers to the right to vote.190 
When the Act was immediately challenged, the Supreme Court recognized 
 
184. Id. at 807.  
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the law’s significance for racial reckoning. 191  In South Carolina v. 
Katzenbach, for instance, an 8-1 majority observed that the Act “was 
designed by Congress to banish the blight of racial discrimination in 
voting”192 and to “truly” realize the promise of the Fifteenth Amendment.193  
In the spirit of reckoning with historical and ongoing 
disenfranchisement, the Supreme Court prohibited particular forms of 
voting discrimination as unconstitutional. In Harper v. Virginia State Board 
of Elections, for instance, a 6-3 majority struck down Virginia’s poll tax of 
$1.50 for violating the Equal Protection Clause.194  Overruling its 1937 
decision in Breedlove v. Suttles, Justice Douglas said that standards of 
equality had to evolve as society transitioned. “[T]he Equal Protection 
Clause is not shackled to the political theory of a particular era,” and so 
previous rulings did not protect poll taxes from being declared 
unconstitutional as understandings of equal protection matured.195  
Despite these early decisions striving for a more just franchise, an 
increasingly conservative Court curtailed their transitional mandate based 
on comparisons between past and present society, limiting what the law 
required and what it permitted of states in the pursuit of transition.196  
By 1980, a 6-3 majority in Mobile v. Bolden upheld the legitimacy of at-
large elections of city commissioners in Mobile, Alabama, even if that 
system diluted the voting strength of Black citizens. 197  In a plurality 
opinion, Justice Stewart declared that because at-large elections would 
disadvantage any voting minority, their deleterious effect upon Black 
people was insufficient proof of discrimination, despite their deliberate 
implementation only fifteen years after the marches from Selma to 
Montgomery in Alabama constituencies with deep-seated racism. 198 
 
191. Pamela S. Karlan, Maps and Misreadings: The Role of Geographic Compactness in Racial 
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Dismissing any continuing racist legacies, the plurality declared, “past 
discrimination cannot, in the manner of original sin, condemn governmental 
action that is not itself unlawful.”199  
Justice Marshall’s dissent argued that the Court’s attempts to isolate 
racism to the past would make it “an accessory to the perpetuation of racial 
discrimination.” 200  He cautioned that the “superficial tranquility” of 
ignoring discrimination “can be but short-lived,” suggesting that the 
plurality opinion had merely delayed an eventual reckoning with the effects 
of voting discrimination. 201  The plurality opinion dismissed Marshall’s 
dissent as political theory, not law.202 
The Supreme Court consistently struck down majority-minority electoral 
districts on the grounds that their creation was too reminiscent of the past. 
In 1993 in Shaw v. Reno,203 Justice O’Connor found it “unsettling how 
closely the North Carolina plan resembles the most egregious racial 
gerrymanders of the past,”204 suggesting a repetition of history rather than a 
departure from it. She worried that “[r]acial gerrymandering, even for 
remedial purposes” would impede transition to “a political system in which 
race no longer matters,” which was “a goal . . . to which the Nation continues 
to aspire.”205 Applying Shaw v. Reno in Miller v. Johnson two years later, 
Justice Kennedy said that “[a]s a Nation we share both the obligation and 
the aspiration of working toward” a society in which “all members of the 
polity share an equal opportunity to gain public office regardless of race,” 
and that “[that] end is neither assured nor well served . . . by carving 
electorates into racial blocs.”206 
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203. 509 U.S. 630 (1993) (raising constitutional concerns about a North Carolina congressional 
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As Congress repeatedly reauthorized the Voting Rights Act, challenges 
continued. In 2009 in Northwest Austin v. Holder,207 Chief Justice Roberts 
observed that the Supreme Court had upheld prior reauthorizations because 
“circumstances continued to justify the provisions,” suggesting that the 
law’s continuation was contingent on the incomplete nature of transition.208 
Justice Thomas, dissenting in part, argued that the Act’s success in ending 
intentional discrimination in the covered jurisdictions had rendered the 
provision unnecessary and unconstitutional. 209  Thomas insisted that 
“[p]unishment for long past sins is not a legitimate basis for imposing a 
forward-looking preventative measure that has already served its 
purpose.”210 It turned out that Roberts would agree four years later in Shelby 
County v. Holder.211  
In a 5-4 decision, Shelby County struck down the coverage formula under 
Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act on the basis that it was “a drastic 
departure from the basic principles of federalism” that was justified only in 
the “exceptional conditions” of the past and did not reflect “current 
needs.”212 While the Court did not strike down the preclearance requirement 
under Section 5, it effectively nullified the law pending new Congressional 
coverage legislation.213  
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The majority opinion of Chief Justice Roberts encapsulates the current 
distancing approach to voting rights. Roberts openly conceded that “voting 
discrimination still exists; no one doubts that.” 214  Yet, he questioned 
whether the Voting Rights Act had a role to play in addressing current 
voting discrimination; instead, he argued that that law “employed 
extraordinary measures to address an extraordinary problem” that no longer 
existed.215  
By isolating the evils of disenfranchisement to Jim Crow, Roberts 
portrayed measures such as the Voting Rights Act as inappropriate for the 
present. He expressed frustration that “[n]early 50 years later, [Sections 4 
and 5 of the Act] are still in effect . . . and are now scheduled to last until 
2031.”216 This was simply too long because “the conditions that originally 
justified these measures no longer characterize voting in the covered 
jurisdictions.”217 “[H]istory did not end in 1965,” he insisted, detailing the 
ways in which Southern states had progressed while avoiding discussion of 
the dynamic evolution of racist practices.218 Although he allowed that the 
Act had contributed to perceived Southern progress, he gave little weight to 
how Section 5 might deter potential regression. Instead, he focused on the 
imperfections in the Section 4 coverage formula, which he felt no longer 
reflected the changed reality in the South.219 Overall, Roberts felt that the 
“strong medicine” that was once needed to cure racism could now do the 
body politic harm.220  
Justice Thomas echoed the distancing logic that “[t]oday, our Nation has 
changed” because “circumstances in the covered jurisdictions can no longer 
be characterized as ‘exceptional’ or ‘unique.’”221 He believed that these 
changes rendered unconstitutional not only the coverage formula in Section 
4, but also the preclearance requirement in Section 5.222 
In an extensive dissent, Justice Ginsburg argued that the Voting Rights 
Act was needed to deal with the more complicated and enduring legacies of 
the past. Congress, she said, had recognized two reasons for continuing the 
preclearance requirement: “First, continuance would facilitate completion 
of the impressive gains thus far made; and second, continuance would guard 
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against backsliding.”223 In other words, the law was necessary to secure 
transition from historical practices, and considered by Congress as “an 
appropriate response” to newly emerged “[s]econd-generation [voting] 
barriers” such as racial gerrymandering and at-large voting.224 
Justice Ginsburg’s rejoinder made clear how sharply distancing and 
reckoning analyses had diverged in their understanding of transition. 
Whereas Chief Justice Roberts tried to prove discontinuity from the past by 
proclaiming that “history did not end in 1965,”225 Justice Ginsburg set out 
to establish continuity by observing that “history repeats itself.”226 Both 
Justices agreed that the Voting Rights Act was “extraordinary,” but 
disagreed about the implications of that label. For Roberts, the law’s 
“extraordinary and unprecedented features” meant that it belonged to a 
distant era.227 For Ginsburg, the law had an “extraordinary” mission “to 
realize the purpose and promise of the Fifteenth Amendment.”228 Although 
the Act had enabled progress, that mission of reckoning was incomplete. 
Striking down voter protections for their success at combating 
discrimination was, she concluded, “like throwing away your umbrella in a 
rainstorm because you are not getting wet.”229 
After Shelby County, that rainstorm became a deluge. Alabama 
announced that it would start requiring photo identification to vote before 
closing thirty-one driver’s license offices, including those in several 
counties with the highest percentages of Black voters.230 North Carolina 
introduced one of the most restrictive voting laws at the time, and Texas 
restored a voter identification law that had been blocked under the Voting 
Rights Act.231 Eight years later, similar laws have been enacted in several 
jurisdictions previously covered by the preclearance provision, as well as in 
other places.232  
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The Supreme Court this Term will consider two consolidated cases under 
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, which prohibits any law that has the 
purpose or effect of abridging racial minorities’ right to vote.233 The 2020 
elections have shown minority disenfranchisement to be a continuing 
feature of American democracy.234 Even with the United States becoming a 
majority-minority nation by 2044, vote dilution and suppression could 
prevent minority numbers from translating into political power. 235  Yet, 
despite constant threats to the right to vote, the Supreme Court may further 
weaken voter protections by declaring that the time for reckoning has 
ended.236  
D. Affirmative Action 
Affirmative action emerged in the 1960s as a way of reckoning with the 
exclusionary legacies of racism.237 However, since affirmative action first 
reached the Supreme Court in the 1970s, decisions have used multiple 
transitional logics. In primarily distancing terms, the Court has restricted 
overt reliance on race in the hopes of transcending racial divisions and 
reaching a colorblind society. In diluted reckoning terms, it has allowed 
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“indirect” 238  reliance on race with the understanding that race remains 
salient in American society, and thus an element of race-consciousness is 
needed to move toward a country free of race-based discrimination.239 
The Supreme Court first ruled on the constitutionality of affirmative 
action in its 1978 decision in Regents of the University of California v. 
Bakke. 240  Four Justices in that case—Justices Blackmun, Brennan, 
Marshall, and White—embraced racial reckoning. Writing for all four in 
dissent, Justice Brennan recounted “how recent the time has been, if it has 
yet come, when the promise of our principles has flowered into the actuality 
of equal opportunity for all regardless of race or color.”241  
Looking backward, Justice Marshall argued that Black people’s 
subordinate social position today was “the tragic but inevitable consequence 
of centuries of unequal treatment.”242 He urged a reckoning with America’s 
racist history and the inclusion of Black people in American life, because 
“[t]o fail to do so is to ensure that America will forever remain a divided 
society.”243 
Looking forward, Justice Blackmun argued that affirmative action would 
help the United States become a society in which affirmative action is no 
longer needed.244 As he put it: “[B]eyond any period of what some would 
claim is only transitional inequality, the United States must and will reach 
a stage of maturity where action along this line is no longer necessary.”245 
But that end point of racial transition would not arrive without racial 
reckoning: “In order to get beyond racism, we must first take account of 
race. There is no other way.”246  
Each of these opinions conceived of reckoning as a necessary path to 
distancing; without race-based steps to undo historical legacies, American 
society would remain segregated and stratified. Justices Blackmun, 
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Brennan, Marshall, and White would have upheld race-based affirmative 
action, even if it would “upset the settled expectations of nonminorities.”247 
In an opinion that would prove hugely influential in constitutional law, 
Justice Powell took a different view of transition. He declared that changes 
in American society since 1868 meant that “it was no longer possible to peg 
the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment to the struggle for equality of 
one racial minority.”248 From this distancing perspective, too much time had 
passed and there had been too many intervening events since Reconstruction 
to justify a strong reckoning jurisprudence under the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
Powell cautioned that legal doctrine could not resolve transitional 
problems and that “transitory considerations” ought not to influence legal 
doctrine.249  Yet, despite this caution, Powell applied his own theory of 
transition to limit affirmative action. America, he declared, had become “a 
Nation of minorities” in which “[e]ach had to struggle”250 and none had a 
singular claim to reckoning. 251  He worried that race-based affirmative 
action “may serve to exacerbate racial and ethnic antagonisms rather than 
alleviate them,”252 expressing particular concern for “innocent” Whites who 
“bear the burdens of redressing grievances not of their making.”253 From 
this transitional theory, Powell’s opinion steered affirmative action away 
from programs explicitly based on race toward those in which reliance on 
race is less conspicuous, and away from racial reckoning toward the more 
universal rationale of “diversity.”254  
In 2003, Grutter v. Bollinger endorsed Justice Powell’s opinion in 
Bakke.255 Yet, even as Grutter accepted Bakke’s constraints on the use of 
race in admissions, it embraced a more expansive understanding of the 
transitional functions that race-sensitive affirmative action could perform. 
Writing for a 5-4 majority, Justice O’Connor acknowledged that such 
affirmative action could “promote[] ‘cross-racial understanding,’ help[] to 
break down racial stereotypes, and ‘enable[] [students] to better understand 
persons of different races.’”256 It could also “cultivate a set of leaders with 
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legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry” by ensuring that “the path to 
leadership [is] visibly open to talented and qualified individuals of every 
race and ethnicity.”257 
Grutter proclaimed that distancing from the nation’s past was incomplete 
and still required a modicum of reckoning. Justice O’Connor pointed to the 
“unique experience of being a racial minority in a society, like our own, in 
which race unfortunately still matters.”258 As she explained: “By virtue of 
our Nation’s struggle with racial inequality, [minority] students are both 
likely to have experiences of particular importance to the Law School’s 
mission, and less likely to be admitted in meaningful numbers on criteria 
that ignore those experiences.”259 Limited use of race in admissions would 
allow for reckoning while distancing, reducing racial disparities and 
ultimately the need for overt racial considerations. However, because it 
relied on “dangerous” classifications rooted in a racist past, O’Connor 
insisted that race-sensitive affirmative action “must have a logical end 
point.” 260  Based on the progress made during the previous twenty-five 
years, she predicted that “25 years from now, the use of racial preferences 
will no longer be necessary to further the interest approved today.”261 
Justice Ginsburg suggested that much more racial reckoning was 
necessary. Her concurrence in Grutter described the timeline of twenty-five 
years as a “hope, but not [a] firm[] forecast,” pointing out the nonlinear 
progress of the previous twenty-five years. 262  Her dissent in Gratz v. 
Bollinger (a sibling case decided on the same day as Grutter) pushed even 
more for reckoning. Rejecting distancing in express terms, Ginsburg wrote: 
“[W]e are not far distant from an overtly discriminatory past, and the effects 
of centuries of law-sanctioned inequality remain painfully evident in our 
communities and schools.” 263  Proximity to historical injustice made 
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affirmative action a transitional necessity: “The stain of generations of racial 
oppression is still visible in our society, and the determination to hasten its 
removal remains vital.”264  
Meanwhile, Grutter dissents also used transitional arguments to oppose 
affirmative action. From his distinctive reckoning perspective, Justice 
Thomas argued that any government intervention involving race either 
harms Black people or cannot be trusted not to harm them. Quoting an 1865 
address by Frederick Douglass, in which he asked the nation to “[d]o 
nothing with us,” Thomas urged that genuine reckoning with racial 
wrongdoing required inaction.265  
Offering his hybrid transitional viewpoint, Justice Kennedy argued that 
direct reliance on racial categories would “perpetuate the hostilities that 
proper consideration of race is designed to avoid.”266 Although Kennedy 
believed both reckoning and distancing had their place, even rectifying 
racial exclusion could not justify the risks of racial categorization. Kennedy 
instead wanted racially indirect admissions programs that would “bring[] 
about the harmony and mutual respect among all citizens that our 
constitutional tradition has always sought.”267 
In 2014, Justice Kennedy again worried that reckoning which risked 
disharmony would threaten transition. Writing for a majority that upheld 
Michigan’s ballot initiative banning affirmative action, Kennedy cautioned: 
“Government action that classifies individuals on the basis of race . . . 
carries the danger of perpetuating the very racial divisions the polity seeks 
to transcend.”268  
By contrast, Justice Sotomayor’s fifty-five-page-long dissent 
emphasized the need for honest racial reckoning: “The way to stop 
discrimination on the basis of race is to speak openly and candidly on the 
subject of race, and to apply the Constitution with eyes open to the 
unfortunate effects of centuries of racial discrimination,” she wrote. 269 
Setting out the various ways in which “race matters” in American society, 
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Sotomayor urged her colleagues to recognize how their decision upholding 
an affirmative action ban would hurt transition.270 
Most recently, the Supreme Court confirmed the constitutionality of 
affirmative action in Fisher v. University of Texas in 2016. 271  Justice 
Kennedy’s majority opinion revealed that although he remained concerned 
about racial harmony, his perspective had evolved since Grutter.272 Fisher 
reflected the understanding that in an American society where race still 
matters, racial harmony and transition may be impossible without race-
sensitive measures. 
Where Justice Kennedy went from affirmative action dissenter to 
defender, Justice Thomas doubled down. In reckoning terms, Thomas 
compared affirmative action to slavery and Jim Crow on the basis that “[t]he 
worst forms of racial discrimination in this Nation have always been 
accompanied by straight-faced representations that discrimination helped 
minorities.” 273  He further equated arguments made in favor of racial 
diversity to those that were “advanced in support of racial segregation in the 
1950’s, but emphatically rejected by this Court.”274 For him, true racial 
reckoning meant ending “perpetual racial tinkering by the State.”275 
A Supreme Court bolstered by three Trump appointees may be willing 
to reconsider this line of cases. In September 2019, a federal judge upheld 
Harvard College’s affirmative action program for reasons steeped in 
transition. 276  “The rich diversity at Harvard and other colleges and 
universities and the benefits that flow from that diversity will foster the 
tolerance, acceptance and understanding,” Judge Allison D. Burroughs 
wrote, “that will ultimately make race conscious admissions obsolete.”277 
The First Circuit upheld this opinion in November 2020. 278  Given the 
opportunity to hear Students for Fair Admissions v. Harvard or a similar 
case, the Supreme Court is likely to ground its arguments about affirmative 
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action in the circumstances and needs of a society in transition.279 Therefore, 
when affirmative action returns to the Court, supporters and critics will not 
only be litigating specific admissions policies. They will also be litigating 
whether America’s racial past is truly behind it—and whether affirmative 
action can help complete the transition. 
E. Disparate Impact 
Disparate impact laws allow discrimination to be measured by the 
disproportionate harm a practice inflicts on racial minorities, even without 
proof of intentional discrimination.280 As these laws redress enduring racial 
disparities, they are supported by those who perceive a connection between 
current disparities and past or present state action and challenged by those 
who deny any such connection. Accordingly, while a reckoning strand of 
jurisprudence has recognized the transitional necessity of disparate impact 
liability, another distancing strand has placed limitations on disparate 
impact claims and restricted them to particular statutory contexts.  
The Supreme Court first recognized disparate impact liability in its 1971 
decision in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 281  Griggs allowed plaintiffs to 
challenge an employer’s job requirements of a standardized test and a high 
school degree based on a disparate impact on minority applicants.282 In so 
doing, it identified a distinctly reckoning-related objective of Title VII, 
which is to “remove barriers that have operated in the past to favor an 
identifiable group of white employees over other employees.”283 As society 
sought to surmount racial wrongdoing, it said, “practices, procedures, or 
tests neutral on their face, and even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be 
maintained if they operate to ‘freeze’ the status quo of prior discriminatory 
employment practices.” 284  Such “freezing” of an unequal and 
discriminatory status quo would impede transition to a world where “race, 
religion, nationality, and sex become irrelevant.”285 
Griggs stood for the principle that eliminating overt discrimination was 
not enough to complete racial transition; disparate impact liability was 
needed to deal with covert forms of discrimination and disparities that 
 
279. Racial Indirection, supra note 238, at 2560–62.  
280. In so doing, disparate impact laws tackle implicit bias and structural discrimination that are 
common in a society transitioning from an oppressive past. See Reva B. Siegel, Race-Conscious but 
Race-Neutral: The Constitutionality of Disparate Impact in the Roberts Court, 66 ALA. L. REV. 653, 
657–59 (2015).  
281. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). See generally Alfred W. Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradise: Griggs v. 
Duke Power Co. and the Concept of Employment Discrimination, 71 MICH. L. REV. 59 (1972). 
282. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 425–28. 
283. Id. at 429–30.  
284. Id. at 430.  












required focused action. However, changes in the composition of the 
Supreme Court assured that Griggs, rather than declaring an overarching 
reckoning principle, would have its impact confined to particular 
discrimination cases. 
Only five years after Griggs in 1976, a differently constituted 7-2 
majority in Washington v. Davis upheld a qualifying test for police officers 
that had a disparate impact on Black applicants. 286  Ignoring Griggs’ 
reckoning with race-based educational disparities, the Davis Court had 
“difficulty understanding how a law establishing a racially neutral 
qualification for employment is nevertheless racially discriminatory” 
because of racially disproportionate consequences.287 It further expressed 
concern that accepting disparate impact liability under the Constitution 
would threaten laws (like the tax code) “that may be more burdensome to 
the poor and to the average black than to the more affluent white.”288 
Citing Davis ten years later in 1986, a 5-4 majority in McCleskey v. Kemp 
upheld a Black man’s death penalty conviction despite statistical evidence 
showing racial disparities in Georgia’s capital sentencing process.289 The 
McCleskey Court worried that accepting that “racial bias has impermissibly 
tainted the capital sentencing decision” would lead to “similar claims as to 
other types of penalty.” 290  To that Court, preserving a potentially 
discriminatory status quo was a more constitutionally acceptable risk than 
initiating a systemic reckoning.291  
Justice Brennan labeled the McCleskey Court’s reasoning “a fear of too 
much justice.” 292  His dissent recognized racial disparities in Georgia’s 
capital sentencing process as a testament to “[t]he ongoing influence of 
history.” 293  Rejecting a superficial distancing from historical racism, 
Brennan refused to “pretend that in three decades we have completely 
escaped the grip of a historical legacy spanning centuries.” 294  Instead, 
 
286. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); see Charles R. Lawrence, III, The Id, the Ego, 
and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987) (critiquing 
the discriminatory purpose standard in Davis); David A. Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and the Taming 
of Brown, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 935 (1989) (same). 
287. Davis, 426 U.S. at 245.  
288. Id. at 248; see DOROTHY A. BROWN, THE WHITENESS OF WEALTH: HOW THE TAX SYSTEM 
IMPOVERISHES BLACK AMERICANS–AND HOW WE CAN FIX IT (forthcoming 2021).  
289. 481 U.S. 279 (1987); see Randall L. Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp: Race, Capital 
Punishment, and the Supreme Court, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1388, 1389 (1988) (comparing McCleskey to 
Plessy and Korematsu); Reva B. Siegel, Blind Justice: Why the Court Refused to Accept Statistical 
Evidence of Discriminatory Purpose in McCleskey v. Kemp—and Some Pathways for Change, 112 NW. 
U. L. REV. 1269 (2018) (describing the historical context surrounding McCleskey). 
290. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 315.  
291. Id. at 305.  
292. Id. at 339 (Brennan, J., dissenting).  
293. Id. at 333.  
294. Id. at 344.  











transition required time to grapple with “the subtle and persistent influence 
of the past” because “the reverberations of injustice are not so easily 
confined.”295 
Ricci v. DeStefano in 2009 returned disparate impact to the spotlight.296 
Ricci held that New Haven violated Title VII by discarding the results of a 
promotional exam—one that would have promoted a disproportionate 
number of White candidates over minority candidates—after the test had 
been administered.297 Writing for a 5-4 majority, Justice Kennedy noted the 
perceived tension between reckoning and distancing, that is, “the tension 
between eliminating segregation and discrimination on the one hand and 
doing away with all governmentally imposed discrimination based on race 
on the other.”298 In his view, reconciling these competing transitional goals 
required flexible rather than mechanical approaches.  
Where Justice Kennedy saw transitional goals in tension, Justice 
Ginsburg saw harmony. Her dissent emphasized that ending “needlessly 
exclusionary selection processes” actually encouraged “race-neutral means 
to increase minority . . . participation.”299 In this way, Title VII’s disparate 
impact provision promoted reckoning by desegregating employment and 
distancing by moving away from racial considerations.300 
Disparate impact survived its most recent challenge in Texas v. Inclusive 
Communities.301 Writing for a 5-4 majority, Justice Kennedy explained how 
disparate impact liability promoted reckoning by targeting “housing 
restrictions that function unfairly to exclude minorities from certain 
neighborhoods without any sufficient justification.” 302  Despite these 
benefits for reckoning, Kennedy limited disparate impact liability to 
facilitate distancing. He worried that such liability “might cause race to be 
 
295. Id.  
296. Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009); see Cheryl I. Harris & Kimberly West-Faulcon, 
Reading Ricci: Whitening Discrimination, Racing Test Fairness, 58 UCLA L. REV. 73, 82–86 (2010) 
(critiquing Ricci for validating a racial framing where “present-day discrimination is largely a problem 
confronting whites” and the pursuit of test fairness is by definition a racial agenda); Helen Norton, The 
Supreme Court’s Post-Racial Turn Towards a Zero-Sum Understanding of Equality, 52 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 197, 223 (2010) (arguing that Ricci’s highly differing narratives reflect “the Court’s deeply 
divided views over the meaning of equality . . . informed by a divided empirical assessment of the United 
States’ post-racial status”). 
297. Ricci, 557 U.S. at 580; see Mark S. Brodin, Ricci v. DeStefano: The New Haven Firefighters 
Case and the Triumph of White Privilege, 20 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 161, 204–05, 224 (2011) 
(critiquing Ricci’s “equation of test success with merit” despite White firefighters having “generational 
advantages” on the same test); Norton, supra note 296, at 220 (noting that the Ricci dissent discussed 
national and local histories of racism in government and questioned the test’s ability to pick true leaders).  
298. Ricci, 557 U.S. at 582.  
299. Id. at 627 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  
300. Ginsburg noted that “[f]irefighting is a profession in which the legacy of racial discrimination 
casts an especially long shadow,” suggesting the need for additional reckoning. Id. at 609.  
301. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 576 U.S. 519 (2015).  












used and considered in a pervasive way and ‘would almost inexorably lead’ 
governmental or private entities to use ‘numerical quotas.’”303 Safeguards, 
such as establishing causality between a policy and a statistical disparity, 
were needed in order to avoid undue perpetuation of racial considerations.304  
Ultimately, Inclusive Communities understood the law’s significance for 
racial transition. “Much progress remains to be made in our Nation’s 
continuing struggle against racial isolation,” Justice Kennedy concluded.305 
“The Court acknowledges the Fair Housing Act’s continuing role in moving 
the Nation toward a more integrated society.”306 
Unsurprisingly, Justice Thomas disagreed with this transition project. 
Because he doubted that racially disparate practices were discriminatory at 
all, Thomas would have ended disparate impact liability under both the Fair 
Housing Act and Title VII.307 Meanwhile, Justice Alito accepted the Fair 
Housing Act’s transitional aim308 but rejected disparate impact liability on 
both textual309 and transitional310 grounds, echoing Kennedy’s concern that 
disparate impact liability may “perpetuate race-based considerations rather 
than move beyond them.”311 
In August 2019, the Trump Department of Housing and Urban 
Development issued a proposed rule that would make it more difficult to 
bring successful disparate impact claims under the Fair Housing Act.312 
 
303. Id. at 542 (quoting Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio, 490 U.S. 642, 653 (1989)). 
304. Furthermore, disparate impact liability had to be limited to “sustain a vibrant and dynamic 
free-enterprise system,” suggesting that the nation’s racial transition, although important, is not 
necessarily the paramount objective. Id. at 533. 
305. Id. at 546. 
306. Id. at 546–47; see Robert G. Schwemm, Fair Housing Litigation after Inclusive 
Communities: What’s New and What’s Not, 115 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 106 (2015) (noting that 
Inclusive Communities solidified disparate impact theory in fair housing cases and anticipating future 
cases stemming from landlords’ use of prior criminal records and refusal to rent to voucher holders, 
restrictions on housing opportunity connected with geography, and mortgage providers screening using 
credit scores or tactics that exclude minorities disproportionately). 
307. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, 576 U.S. at 547–57 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
308. Id. at 560 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
309. Id. at 559–63. 
310. Id. at 589. 
311. Id. (quoting id. at 543 (majority op.)). 
312. Linda Greenhouse, Civil Rights Turned Topsy-Turvy, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 29, 2019), https://w 
ww.nytimes.com/2019/08/29/opinion/trump-civil-rights.html [https://perma.cc/2SNP-4WZK]. Henry 
Rose argues that the Department’s proposal would not be harmonious with Inclusive Communities, 
which “explicitly identified ‘perpetuating segregation’ as a discriminatory effect that the [Fair Housing 
Act] is designed to prevent.” Henry Rose, How the Trump Administration’s Plan to Limit Disparate 
Impact Liability Would Undermine the Fair Housing Act’s Goal of Promoting Residential Integration 
12 (unpublished manuscript) (available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm=3464555). 
Additionally, in the final weeks of the Trump Administration, the Department of Justice sought to 
limit disparate impact liability under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act. Katie Benner & Erica L. Green, 
Justice Dept. Seeks to Pare Back Civil Rights Protections for Minorities, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 5, 2021), http 
s://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/05/us/politics/justice-department-disparate-impact.html [https://perma.c 
c/F6V6-HL6R]. 











However, a federal judge issued a nationwide preliminary injunction in 
October 2020,313 and the Biden Administration has committed to vigorously 
enforcing the Fair Housing Act.314 Nevertheless, Justice Kennedy’s vote 
was crucial to sustaining disparate impact liability; changes in the 
composition of the Court have thrown its doctrinal future into doubt.315  
F. The Roberts Court and Ramos v. Louisiana  
This Part has shown the significance of transitional reasoning to racial 
equality decisions and how that reasoning has evolved. Recent decisions 
reflect a shift from a reckoning viewpoint—that present discrimination and 
disparities are the legacies of the past—toward a distancing viewpoint—that 
present discrimination and disparities are far removed from the past. While 
the Court has not been completely consistent in its embrace of distancing,316 
the jurisprudence of several conservative Justices argues that because 
America’s racial transition has mostly concluded, measures once deemed 
beneficial are now burdensome. Some find the continuation of racial 
reckoning itself a barrier to completing racial transition.  
This trend is problematic, however, because despite some indications of 
racial progress, American society remains deeply racially stratified for both 
enduring and evolving reasons, suggesting that more reckoning is needed.317 
 
313. Katy O’Donnell, Court Stops Launch of HUD Rule that Makes It Harder to Prove 
Discrimination, POLITICO (Oct. 26, 2020), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/10/26/court-stops-hud-
rule-discrimination-432592 [https://perma.cc/4QBQ-572P]. 
314. The Biden Plan for Investing in Our Communities Through Housing, https://joebiden.com/ho 
using/ [https://perma.cc/B23F-54Z6]. On using the Fair Housing Act to address racial disparaties, see 
Deborah N. Archer, The New Housing Segregation: The Jim Crow Effects of Crime-Free Housing 
Ordinances, 118 MICH. L. REV. 173 (2019). 
315. Legal scholars have discussed whether statutory disparate impact standards contravene 
constitutional equal protection standards, making disparate impact laws unconstitutional under current 
doctrine. Writing before Ricci was decided, Richard Primus outlines three possible readings of disparate 
impact decisions, including a general reading that views any disparate impact standard as an equal 
protection problem. Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact: Round Three, 117 
HARV. L. REV. 494 (2003). Samuel Bagenstos predicts that although Inclusive Communities provides a 
path for reconciling disparate impact and equal protection, a more conservative Court “will quite likely 
hold, notwithstanding Inclusive Communities, that disparate impact laws are unconstitutional.” Samuel 
Bagenstos, Disparate Impact and the Role of Classification and Motivation in Equal Protection Law 
After Inclusive Communities, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 1115, 1167 (2016). Writing in the Trump era, Reva 
Siegel suggests that disparate impact can survive “if disparate impact is not defended solely as a measure 
of racial justice, but also serves as a standard of inclusion that other Americans might claim.” Reva B. 
Siegel, The Constitutionalization of Disparate Impact—Court-Centered and Popular Pathways: A 
Comment on Owen Fiss’s Brennan Lecture, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 2001, 2022 (2018). 
316. For example, Parents Involved and Shelby County, which were authored by Chief Justice 
Roberts, reason from distancing much more strongly than Fisher and Inclusive Communities, which 
were authored by Justice Kennedy.  
317. For research linking present day United States to its racist history, see generally IBRAM X. 













Although transitional societies “must deal with the past and not dwell in 
it,”318 the jurisprudence of the U.S. Supreme Court has veered too far from 
dealing with the past. The Court has legitimated the belief that brief 
implementation of discrete measures has resolved centuries of racial 
subordination,319 when transitional justice is an intergenerational project 
requiring holistic approaches. 320  Such a distancing approach would be 
tenuous even in a society that had implemented a transitional justice 
strategy; it seems altogether untenable in an American society weighted by 
the failed promises of the First and Second Reconstructions.321 
Despite these limitations, the Roberts Court is likely to continue 
developing its own distancing jurisprudence to reorient racial equality law. 
For instance, the Court may discontinue or weaken current civil rights laws 
 
(2017); KEEANGA-YAMAHTTA TAYLOR, RACE FOR PROFIT: HOW BANKS AND THE REAL ESTATE 
INDUSTRY UNDERMINED BLACK HOMEOWNERSHIP (2019); MEHRSA BARADARAN, THE COLOR OF 
MONEY: BLACK BANKS AND THE RACIAL WEALTH GAP (2017); RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF 
LAW: A FORGOTTEN HISTORY OF HOW OUR GOVERNMENT SEGREGATED AMERICA (2017); KHALIL 
GIBRAN MUHAMMAD, THE CONDEMNATION OF BLACKNESS: RACE, CRIME, AND THE MAKING OF 
MODERN URBAN AMERICA (2010); HARRIET A. WASHINGTON, MEDICAL APARTHEID: THE DARK 
HISTORY OF MEDICAL EXPERIMENTATION ON BLACK AMERICANS FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE 
PRESENT (2006). 
318. Boraine, supra note 81, at 27.  
319. See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 175 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) 
(“[C]ompared to more than two centuries of firmly entrenched official discrimination, the experience 
with the desegregation remedies ordered by the District Court has been evanescent.”).  
320. For example, Canada’s Indian Residential Schools Settlement Agreement of 2007 included 
$125 million to address “the legacy of harms suffered at Indian Residential Schools including the 
intergenerational effects.” Chantelle Bellrichard, Residential School Healing Fund Set to End as First 
Nations Leaders Say Demand for Services Growing, CBC NEWS (Nov. 25, 2020, 4:00 AM), https://www 
.cbc.ca/news/indigenous/residential-schools-end-healing-fund-1.5814505 [https://perma.cc/L3NR-HW 
WW]. 
321. A distancing jurisprudence further bolsters America’s “creedal story” that depicts American 
history as a “steady fulfillment” of the idea that “all men are created equal.” Aziz Rana, Race and the 
American Creed: Recovering Black Radicalism, N+1 (Winter 2016), https://nplusonemag.com/issue-24/ 
politics/race-and-the-american-creed/ [https://perma.cc/9VXZ-4XV7]. Because enduring racial 
oppression challenges the notion of America’s founding commitment to equality, a distancing approach 
that isolates racism to discrete historical periods is one way to “recover” American national identity. See 
Meister, supra note 27, at 86 (describing a post-Civil War project of national “recovery”); Justin 
Collings, The Supreme Court and the Memory of Evil, 71 STAN. L. REV. 265 (2019) (chronicling a 
“restorative” post-Civil War jurisprudence). By painting slavery and segregation as exceptional periods 
that were successfully overcome, distancing obscures how white supremacy and settler colonialism have 
been the nation’s governing doctrines from the beginning and are still with us. See AZIZ RANA, THE 
TWO FACES OF AMERICAN FREEDOM (2011); KENDI, supra note 317; Waldstreicher, supra note 36; 
Rogers M. Smith, Beyond Tocqueville, Myrdal, and Hartz: The Multiple Traditions in America, 87 AM. 
POL. SCI. REV. 549 (1993). In so doing, distancing turns racial transition into a national redemption story 
instead of a cautionary tale about how racism endures and evolves. This redemption story in turn serves 
both as a sword for ending civil rights measures and as a shield against criticizing inequitable laws and 
policies. Meanwhile, America’s creedal story take the place of other, more egalitarian ideals that may 
be recovered from the past or imagined in the future. See WILLIAM J. BARBER, II WITH JONATHAN 
WILSON-HARTGROVE, THE THIRD RECONSTRUCTION: MORAL MONDAYS, FUSION POLITICS, AND THE 
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by counting on Congress to “update” laws for the twenty-first century,322 
while constricting legally recognized racial justice claims and the practical 
structuring of civil rights measures.  
On the current Court, for instance, Chief Justice Roberts is deeply 
invested in restoring a social and legal status quo devoid of “extraordinary” 
transitional practices. In Shelby County, Roberts struck down key provisions 
of the Voting Rights Act on the belief that voting discrimination today—
which he said “still exists”—was less evil and more ordinary than the 
“extraordinary problem” of the past. 323  As such, Roberts’ distancing 
approach requires terminating “extraordinary” civil rights protections even 
if the problems they addressed have not ended, but simply shifted form. 
Especially when civil rights measures offend his vision of a colorblind 
society, he feels that their continuation could “do more harm than good.”324 
Meanwhile, as the second African American on the Court, Justice 
Thomas appeals to both distancing and reckoning to reject civil rights 
measures.325 In distancing terms, he contends that segments of American 
society are no longer demonstrably affected by historical injustice, 
rendering protections against that injustice inappropriate.326 In reckoning 
terms, he suggests that contemporary civil rights laws harm Black people 
by virtue of being government interventions involving race.327 According to 
Thomas, race-sensitive measures do not only prevent the United States from 
leaving its racist past behind, they represent a continuation or repetition of 
that past. Because he maintains that government interventions can only 
 
322. Charles & Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 190 (noting that replacing the Voting Rights Act 
requires rebuilding a consensus around what discrimination and voting rights mean; only then can a new 
public policy become a superstatute, upheld by all branches). 
323. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 534, 536 (2013). 
324. Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 572 U.S. 291, 315 (2014) (Roberts, C.J., 
concurring). 
325. Whereas his White conservative colleagues tailor their transitional arguments to American 
society as a whole, White Americans, cross-racial relations, and only occasionally Black people and 
non-Black minorities, Justice Thomas frequently appeals to the interests of Black Americans. In a recent 
book, Corey Robin argues that “Thomas is a black man whose conservatism is overwhelmingly defined 
by and oriented toward the interests of black people, as he understands them.” COREY ROBIN, THE 
ENIGMA OF CLARENCE THOMAS 4 (2019). Rejecting this depiction, Randall Kennedy argues that “a far 
better guide to Clarence Thomas’s thinking than the Constitution or The Autobiography of Malcolm X 
are the platforms of the Republican Party and the talking points of Rush Limbaugh.” Randall Kennedy, 
The Apparatchik: The rise of Clarence Thomas, THE NATION (Oct. 29, 2019), https://www.thenation.co 
m/article/archive/enigma-clarence-thomas-book-review/ [https://perma.cc/T5Y6-NCSE]. This 
disagreement raises questions whether judges’ claims about transition are grounded in some normative 
conception of a racially just society or whether they are merely politically expedient justifications for 
reorienting racial equality law. See infra Part III.B.1. 














really harm Black people, 328  his reckoning approach requires ending 
“perpetual racial tinkering by the State.”329 
Last Term’s decision in Ramos v. Louisiana sheds some light on the 
transitional approaches of two of the Court’s newer members.330 Writing for 
a 6-3 majority, Justice Gorsuch recognized that Louisiana’s law allowing 
non-unanimous jury verdicts arose out a convention whose “avowed 
purpose . . . was to ‘establish the supremacy of the white race.’”331 Likewise, 
Oregon’s law could be “traced to the rise of the Ku Klux Klan and efforts 
to dilute ‘the influence of racial, ethnic, and religious minorities on Oregon 
juries.’” 332  The majority opinion considered these “racist origins of 
Louisiana’s and Oregon’s laws” relevant to its legal analysis.333 Justice 
Kavanaugh’s concurrence similarly recognized “non-unanimous juries as 
one pillar of a comprehensive and brutal program of racist Jim Crow 
measures against African-Americans. . . .”334 For him, these racist origins 
colored contemporary practice and were “significant” to legal analysis.335 
Refusing to completely disassociate past and present, he noted how “[t]hen 
and now, non-unanimous juries can silence the voices and negate the votes 
of black jurors. . . .”336 By contrast, Justice Alito’s dissent deemed the racist 
origins of a practice to mean “nothing” for contemporary constitutional 
questions.337  
To many court watchers, Ramos reads like a reckoning opinion. As Leah 
Litman wrote immediately following the decision: “Perhaps Ramos signals 
that a new majority of the court is occasionally willing to acknowledge 
portions of America’s racist history. Perhaps someday a majority of the 
court will be willing to do so in voting rights cases and across the board.”338 
However, Ramos is also a distancing opinion in condemning only Jim 
Crow-style racism. Some Justices in the Ramos majority may be less willing 
to address racist practices that cannot be easily traced to a form practiced in 
an earlier era, as doing so would expand the scope of the transition 
 
328. See generally Robin, supra note 325. 
329. Fisher I, 570 U.S. 297, 325 (2013) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
330. Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390 (2020) (Gorsuch, J.). 
331. Id. at 1394. 
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333. Id. at 1405. 
334. Id. at 1417 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). 
335. Id.  
336. Id. at 1418. 
337. Id. at 1426 (Alito, J., dissenting). Invoking Ramos two months later, Justice Alito deemed 
the origins of a practice to be extremely relevant where it involved prejudice against Catholics. Espinoza 
v. Montana Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246, 2267–74 (2020) (Alito, J., concurring).  
338. Leah Litman, The Supreme Court Is Split on How to Talk About Race, SLATE (Apr. 22, 2020, 
6:53 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2020/04/supreme-court-racism-ramos-v-louisiana.html 
[https://perma.cc/UM46-LQN4]. 











project. 339  While Ramos suggests the possibility of occasional, limited 
reckoning, it gives no indication of a reversal of the trend toward distancing. 
Indeed, occasional reckoning may sustain the illusion that Supreme Court 
Justices are committed to surmounting racism in all of its forms rather than 
implicated in sustaining racism in the name of a colorblind society.340 
Given recent appointments on the Supreme Court,341 we urgently need 
analytical tools to evaluate different transitional arguments and to decide 
which claims should have purchase. To continue developing such tools, the 
next Part of this Article places the Court’s local theories of transition in 
dialogue with the international field of transitional justice.  
III. TRANSITION AND THE SUPREME COURT 
Courts of law play a central role in transition processes. While special 
judicial mechanisms are sometimes established for these processes, 
standard courts are often responsible for promoting truth and reconciliation, 
prosecuting human rights violations, redressing victims for historical 
abuses, and articulating rule-of-law standards. In the United States, no 
special courts were established to steer the nation away from slavery and 
segregation. Instead, the U.S. Supreme Court has significantly and 
deliberately shaped the racial transition process. 
This Part uses transitional justice theory to assess the Supreme Court’s 
decision-making, placing its concerns within a broader and deeper context. 
This approach reveals the particular and limited ways in which the Court 
has understood transition—what issues it has prioritized and what it has 
missed—and sheds new light on interpretive disagreements within race 
jurisprudence.  
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A. Transitional Justice Values 
Transitional justice values of accountability, redress, non-repetition, and 
reconciliation provide a vocabulary and a normative framework for 
discussing Supreme Court decisions around race. This Part begins by 
examining how the Court interprets these values in shaping racial equality 
law, highlighting the limitations of both distancing and reckoning analyses.  
1. Accountability 
Promoting accountability is considered an important part of how 
successor regimes deal with the human rights abuses preceding them.342 
Accountability for past wrongs matters for reasons of justice, legitimacy, 
and “social learning.” 343  Past abuses “if left unaddressed, can serve to 
maintain hostile relations and antagonistic identifications even in the 
absence of overt violence.”344 Accounting for the past can signal a shift in 
societal values and delegitimize violence against oppressed groups; failing 
to do so can have the opposite effect.345 
Despite the importance of accountability for transition processes, the 
U.S. Supreme Court has avoided accountability for past and present 
racism. 346  This avoidance is reflected in Brown itself. In a May 1954 
memorandum, Chief Justice Earl Warren instructed his colleagues that the 
Brown opinion should be “above all, non-accusatory.” 347  Accordingly, 
Brown did not mention White people’s humiliating and harmful treatment 
of Black children or segregation’s white supremacist aims. 348  Where 
Randall Kennedy observes that “[m]issing from the most honored race 
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distasteful details of the southern caste system.” Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation 
Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421, 430 n.25 (1960).  











relations decision in American constitutional law is any express reckoning 
with racism,” 349  Angela Onwuachi-Willig elaborates that “Brown 
completely failed to even name, much less recognize, the material benefits 
that had come to Whites, even poor Whites, as a result of Jim Crow 
racism.”350 This failure to hold White people accountable left intact “the 
unchallenged notions about black inferiority and white superiority that . . . 
had become deeply embedded within every aspect of our society.”351 
Post-Brown decisions have likewise avoided accountability for racism in 
various ways. Some of these decisions suggest that because the original 
perpetrators of slavery and Jim Crow are no longer around, it is wrong to 
hold “innocent” succeeding generations to account for historical wrongs.352 
Following this distancing logic, Justice Powell’s plurality opinion in Bakke 
not only refused to recognize Whites as the perpetrators and beneficiaries 
of centuries-long racial subordination, it also depicted Whites as the victims 
of forms of discrimination on par with slavery and segregation.353 Such 
reasoning is inadequate from an accountability perspective because it 
disregards the communal, intergenerational effects of historical injustice 
and the possibility of collective and political (as opposed to individual and 
personal) forms of responsibility.354 Even decisions that have acknowledged 
the need for reckoning have avoided holding entities accountable for racist 
wrongs. The Griggs decision, for instance, went out of its way to absolve 
an employer of any discriminatory intent, despite that employer’s history of 
racial discrimination.355 Such refusals to hold racism and racial privilege to 
account may arise from deference to White Americans’ need for positive 
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self-regard356 and America’s exceptionalist self-image,357 constricting legal 
and political accountability. 
In circumstances where rigorous accountability would deepen social 
divisions, decisionmakers may be justified in pursuing a more tempered 
accountability in the service of other transitional justice values. 358 
Transitional justice approaches seek to “reconcile legal norms that demand 
accountability with political goals such as conflict resolution, truth 
recovery, healing for victims and reconciliation.”359 Some Justices writing 
racial equality decisions may have downplayed accountability in the interest 
of furthering societal reconciliation,360 although evidence of that logic is 
sparse. Indeed, the more salient question is not whether the Supreme Court 
has adequately balanced accountability and other transitional justice values, 
but whether it has considered accountability at all. As Colleen Murphy 
argues with respect to transitional compromises, it matters not only “that 
essential moral values be taken into account and to some extent achieved by 
transitional justice processes,” but also that “their being taken into account 
be made recognizable.”361 Furthermore, even if the Court seeks balance 
between accountability and other values, it remains an open question 
whether that balance is defensible, as sacrificing accountability can itself 
impede reconciliation.362  
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Transitional justice aims to redress human rights violations and give 
effect to human rights norms. 363  Pablo de Greiff, former U.N. Special 
Rapporteur on the promotion of truth, justice, reparation, and guarantees of 
non-recurrence, calls for modes of redress that “not only assuage suffering 
but also restore the rights that were so brutally violated and affirm victims’ 
standing as full citizens.”364  
The United States has never pursued comprehensive redress for slavery, 
Jim Crow practices, and ongoing discrimination. Still, some earlier Supreme 
Court decisions enforced and encouraged discrete racial remedies to reckon 
with historical legacies. Although many of these decisions reflected a 
limited understanding of racial harms and redress and were therefore 
inadequate, they at least recognized an ongoing need for remediation.365 
More recently, the Court has limited even modest forms of racial redress by 
requiring clear links between past wrongs and present remedies and by 
rejecting remedies that directly invoke race. These limitations are ostensibly 
justified in the interest of racial transition: to avoid forms of racial redress 
that the Court considers inapposite and inimical to the transition process.  
For example, the Supreme Court has resisted generalized racial remedies 
to avoid unduly linking past and present society and placing the burden of 
redress on successive generations. In this vein, Justice Powell rejected 
affirmative action aimed at redressing “societal discrimination” because it 
may be “ageless in its reach into the past,”366 “forcing innocent persons . . . 
to bear the burdens of redressing grievances not of their making.” 367 
However, questions of how far back to look and which victims, perpetrators, 
and descendants to involve in transitional justice processes are faced by 
most transitional societies. Their experiences provide insights about 
structuring redress in ways that recognize citizens as individuals, build civic 
trust, and foster social solidarity.368  Insofar as the Court is involved in 
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delimiting acceptable redress for past wrongs, it should grapple with the 
complexity of these questions rather than avoid them.  
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has worried that race-based remedies 
would impede transition by perpetuating racial considerations. As Justice 
Kennedy put it in Parents Involved: “To make race matter now so that it 
might not matter later may entrench the very prejudices we seek to 
overcome.”369 Yet, as discussed above, the evils of racism extend far beyond 
formal uses of race.370 Even reckoning decisions like Brown and Griggs 
failed to address a larger white supremacist system in which Black people 
and other racial minorities suffer brutal abuse by both state and private 
actors.371 More recently, efforts to address this larger system have been 
stymied by a distancing jurisprudence focused on avoiding racial 
classifications. From a transitional justice perspective, determining what 
kinds of redress are needed requires grappling with and making amends for 
the full magnitude of previous and ongoing human rights violations.372 
3. Non-Repetition 
Non-repetition refers to preventing a recurrence of human rights 
violations by addressing their underlying causes.373 Naomi Roht-Arriaza 
explains that “[guarantees of non-recurrence] are broader than avoiding 
recurrence to the specific victim of a violation—even in their narrowest 
acceptation, they look to other potential victims of the same types of 
violations.”374  Pablo de Greiff calls for multidimensional responses “to 
diminish the likelihood of repeated violations,” adding that “neither cost nor 
complexity of interventions is a legitimate excuse for inaction.” 375  
Several reckoning opinions understand civil rights measures as a means 
of non-repetition without using that exact term. According to these opinions, 
voluntary school integration plans are aimed not only at “eradicating earlier 
school segregation,” but also “preventing retrogression.” 376  The 
preclearance requirement for voting changes is meant both to “facilitate 
completion of the impressive gains thus far made” and to “guard against 
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backsliding.” 377  Disparate impact liability in housing seeks to disrupt 
racially disparate “patterns that might otherwise result from covert and illicit 
stereotyping,” even after formal racial discrimination has been outlawed.378 
From a reckoning viewpoint, because mechanisms that perpetuate racist 
human rights violations are various and evolving, measures of non-
repetition must also be diverse and enduring. 
While distancing opinions have also sought non-repetition, their 
predominant concern has been only “the prevention of official conduct 
discriminating on the basis of race.”379 Partly to avoid repeating its own 
errors like Korematsu v. United States, the Court has applied strict scrutiny 
to even benign racial classifications designed to benefit racial minorities: 
“Any retreat from the most searching judicial inquiry can only increase the 
risk of another such error occurring in the future.”380  
However, distancing opinions have rejected more expansive non-
recurrence measures by refusing to recognize contemporary practices and 
structures as repetitions of historical racism. Thus, Chief Justice Roberts in 
Parents Involved disregarded the contributions that voluntary school 
integration plans could make to non-repetition of segregation; additionally, 
his opinion in Shelby County downplayed the significance of preclearance 
in preventing current and future voter suppression.381 Going further, Justice 
Thomas in Northwest Austin categorically rejected “a forward-looking 
preventative measure” like preclearance as “[p]unishment for long past 
sins.”382 Failing to recognize current discrimination and disparities as part 
of a historical pattern hinders efforts at non-repetition, which requires 
“getting at root causes” and “a bottom-up analysis of what those root causes 
are.”383 
4. Reconciliation 
Reconciliation refers to building social trust between members of a 
polity and increasing their willingness to live together peacefully in the 
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wake of a conflictual past.384 Pablo de Greiff characterizes an “unreconciled 
society” as one in which “resentment characterizes the relations among 
citizens and between citizens and their institutions.”385 He emphasizes the 
resentment of victims who have suffered “massive abuse” and who need to 
be the focus of reconciliation efforts.386 Political theorist Mihaela Mihai 
points out that although perpetrators may also experience resentment, some 
negative emotions may be less “democratically legitimate,” and courts may 
play a role in addressing both legitimate and illegitimate negative 
emotions.387  
The Supreme Court’s concern for mitigating racial resentment arguably 
comports with transitional justice’s concern for ensuring peace and 
reconciliation.388  For instance, Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke struck 
down racial quotas to avoid the “deep resentment” likely to be felt by non-
beneficiaries of affirmative action. 389  More recently, Justice Kennedy’s 
decision in Schuette underscored affirmative action’s “latent potential to 
become itself a source of the very resentments and hostilities based on race 
that this Nation seeks to put behind it.”390  However, unlike transitional 
justice approaches, which prioritize the pain of those historically oppressed, 
the Court’s explicit reasoning has prioritized white resentment.391  
The Supreme Court has failed to acknowledge minority resentment even 
in cases where it was presented with briefs highlighting the issue. For 
instance, a Grutter brief filed by student intervenors pointed to the 
“understandable anger and resentment” that stems from limiting affirmative 
action for a few underrepresented minority applicants while allowing the 
unfair advantages of White and wealthy applicants.392  It cautioned that 
striking down affirmative action would “resegregate, divide, and polarize 
our country,” leading to increased social strife.393 However, these minority-
centered narratives are absent from the Court’s recent decisions. Instead, 
Justices have sought to assuage white resentment while doing little to 
actively alleviate minority frustration, treated white negative emotions as 
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more democratically legitimate394  by prioritizing white resentment over 
minority frustration when limiting race-conscious policies. In so doing, the 
Supreme Court has promoted a one-sided reconciliation in which Black 
people must reconcile themselves to a white status quo; meanwhile, White 
people’s sense of entitlement and victimhood remains unchallenged and 
even sacrosanct.395  
In addition to resolving negative emotions, reconciliation involves 
transforming individual and communal identities. In relation to ethnic 
conflicts, Paige Arthur observes that decision-makers may “attempt to forge 
a new national identity to take the place of previous, divisive ones” or may 
“wish to stress individuality over collective identities . . . .”396 However, she 
cautions, “attempting to abolish the ‘old’ identities may simply turn out to 
be a way of confirming their continuing importance.”397 Thus, identity-
based conflict is seldom resolved by whitewashing the past and eliminating 
sociopolitical identities; instead, reconciliation involves facing the past and 
implementing structural changes in order to give old identities and relations 
new meanings.  
Despite recognizing the need for Americans to reconcile with one 
another, some distancing opinions have sought to forge new identities 
without facing enduring divisions and disparities. For instance, Justice 
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Scalia believed affirmative action along racial lines would “reinforce and 
preserve for future mischief the way of thinking that produced race slavery, 
race privilege and race hatred.”398 Promoting a singular national identity, he 
argued: “In the eyes of government, we are just one race here. It is 
American.”399 Stressing individualism over collective identities, he said: 
“The relevant proposition is not that it was blacks, or Jews, or Irish who 
were discriminated against, but that it was individual men and women, 
‘created equal,’ who were discriminated against.”400 Yet, such appeals to 
national identity and individual rights only obscure racial stratification and 
strife. Ignoring the role of race makes it difficult to target transitional 
policies and address and prevent specific dynamics with a basis in race. By 
contrast, the reckoning jurisprudence of those like Justice Marshall and 
Justice Sotomayor recognizes that reconciliation necessitates dealing with 
structural racism and the social significance of race.401 
In sum, Supreme Court opinions have grappled with many of the same 
concerns that animate transitional justice processes elsewhere, but in limited 
ways that fail to realize the key values at stake. For example, whereas 
transitional justice approaches grapple with the relationships between 
accountability, redress, non-repetition, and reconciliation, Supreme Court 
jurisprudence falls short of realizing each of these values and recognizing 
the relationships between them. The failure to realize these transitional 
justice values may be an important part of the United States’ failure to 
combat racism. How much richer could America’s racial transition process 
be if it systematically and comprehensively sought these transitional justice 
values, giving weight to the concerns of historically oppressed groups? 
Engagement with transitional justice reveals that the Supreme Court’s 
treatment of these values is not normatively comprehensive, and invites us 
to steer the United States toward better approaches to transition.402 
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B. Competing Transitional Visions 
Continuing to draw on insights from transitional justice, this Part now 
examines how disagreements within race jurisprudence reflect struggles 
over the ownership of transition and over America’s “unmastered past.” 
Transitional justice can serve as an independent perspective that helps us to 
decide between competing claims about transition. 
1. Interpretive Disagreements 
Transitional justice theory allows us to see disagreements in racial 
equality cases as struggles over the ownership of transitional discourse and 
mechanisms. Christine Bell explains that transitional justice mechanisms 
are hotly contested because of “their capacity to adjudicate on the rights and 
wrongs of a conflict, not only as regards individual culpability but also in 
relation to institutional and social responsibility for the genesis and 
sustenance of the conflict . . . .”403 In other words, because transitional 
justice mechanisms may write dominant narratives for large groups of 
people, there is fierce contestation over the control of those mechanisms. 
These contests are both normative and political in nature. In describing 
normative contests over transitional justice, Bell points to “the battle 
between those who seek to ‘do good’ in protracted social conflict but who 
have competing ideas of what doing good requires.” 404  In describing 
political contests, Bell notes that taking control of transitional justice 
mechanisms “can enable victory in the metaconflict—the conflict about 
what the conflict is about—and thereby enable the victor to tilt all 
transitional mechanisms towards an end point for transition that 
approximates to the victor’s battlefield goals.”405  
From this vantage point, judges’ claims can be read as expressing deep 
normative convictions about the purpose and path of the transition process. 
They can also be interpreted as reflecting a political practice that uses 
transitional discourse and mechanisms to further political goals.406 Given 
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that (1) judges’ normative claims about transition can align with their 
preferred political interests, (2) each side can defend its own claims as the 
best understanding of transition, and (3) each side can accuse the other of 
engaging in a political practice, an independent perspective is needed to 
reveal the actual strengths and inadequacies of competing judicial accounts. 
Transitional justice scholars and practitioners have offered frameworks 
for deciding which approaches should be adopted and which avoided in 
seeking to surmount the past. Examining how American approaches to 
transition accord with or diverge from these international standards can help 
us to both improve strategies and take sides in disagreements. 
Some transitional justice frameworks identify principles that transitional 
decision-making should consider. For instance, Paige Arthur identifies key 
questions to guide transitional justice in the context of identity-based 
conflicts: 
1. Will the initiative provide for accountability, both to the law and 
to all the communities it aims to represent?  
2. Will the initiative be perceived as legitimate by all affected groups? 
3. Will the initiative promote social learning between communities? 
4. Will the initiative promote trust between groups? 
5. Will the initiative make state and/or social institutions more 
representative of the society they serve? 
6. Will the initiative promote and protect the dignity of all?407  
Although these questions are designed to assess political decision-
making, we may apply them to Supreme Court decisions about racial 
integration, voter protection, affirmative action, and other decisions about 
the government’s role in handling racial injustices. For instance, affirmative 
action opinions engage these questions when they seek to “promote[] ‘cross-
racial understanding,’ help[] to break down racial stereotypes, and ‘enable[] 
[students] to better understand persons of different races,’” 408  or 
alternatively deem it “entirely irrelevant whether [affirmative action] 
increases or decreases tolerance.”409 These questions therefore provide a 
framework for assessing judicial interpretations of transitional issues. 
Arthur stipulates that answering these questions should involve 
“judgment based on informed analysis. . . .”410 Instead of relying on the 
Court’s own (potentially incorrect) memory and intuitions about past and 
present society, Justices should critically engage with evidence to 
understand how current practices disrupt or perpetuate historical 
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injustices.411 Using these questions as an evaluative framework, judicial 
reasoning that pays careful attention to the country’s actual historical and 
social circumstances, in addition to the multiple dimensions of transition, 
would have the most purchase. 
Other frameworks are more directly aimed at distinguishing between 
desirable and undesirable forms of transitional justice. For instance, 
Rodrigo Uprimny and Maria Paula Saffon provide guidance for 
distinguishing between “manipulative” transitional justice, which “serves to 
preserve the unequal power relationships prevalent in the extant regime,” 
and “democratic” transitional justice, which “takes the rights of victims 
seriously and seeks to constrain the political process by the imperative to 
protect and satisfy these rights. . . .”412  
Applied to the Supreme Court, this distinction cautions against 
presuming transitional reasoning to be anti-racist, as its use may serve to 
legitimize and entrench racist structures.413 For example, distancing may be 
used as a politically convenient argument for ending measures that enhance 
the inclusion and influence of Black Americans and challenge white 
supremacy. Therefore, “it is important to carefully analyze if the language 
of transitional justice . . . may be used not only for promoting transformative 
effects, but also for perpetuating the status quo.”414  
From a philosophical perspective, Colleen Murphy articulates criteria for 
distinguishing principled from unprincipled compromises in transitional 
justice processes.415 Such criteria are needed because although transitional 
justice frequently requires compromises, there is a risk of “selling victims 
short” and “entrenching the status quo” by prioritizing political feasibility 
over necessary transformation.416 Drawing on Lon Fuller’s principles for 
the rule of law, Murphy argues that a principled compromise must satisfy 
“the morality of duty,” which suggests a minimum threshold required to do 
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justice to victims, and “the morality of aspiration,” which suggests a more 
robust protection of values. 417  However, progress does not amount to 
justice: “While a transitional justice process may be a moral improvement 
on the ways wrongs were addressed during conflict and repression, that 
process may still constitute a failure if it does not meet this threshold.”418 
Furthermore, principled compromises must take account of the experiences 
and insights of historically marginalized groups.419 
Such an approach to distinguishing between justified and unjustified 
compromises aligns with the American civil rights tradition; as Dr. King 
said in 1959: “While compromise is an absolute necessity in any moment 
of social transition, it must be the creative, honest compromise of a policy, 
not the negative and cowardly compromise of a principle.” 420  From a 
transitional justice perspective, it is not surprising that the Supreme Court’s 
race jurisprudence has been forged through compromises. 421  Instead, 
transitional justice theory enables us to recognize compromises that are 
implicit in the Court’s racial equality opinions and deliberate whether those 
compromises are principled and defensible or unjustified and undesirable, 
given ethical principles and political constraints. 
These are only a few examples of how transitional justice frameworks 
can be used to assess whether judicial opinions are conducive or detrimental 
to the transition process. Seriously considering these external perspectives 
can reorient the law toward a better internal approach, one that learns from 
other countries’ experiences of transition. 
2. Unmastered Pasts 
Transitional justice thinking illuminates another way to understand 
disagreements within race jurisprudence—as a reflection of America’s 
“unmastered past.” Historian Gavriel Rosenfeld describes an unmastered 
past as “a historical legacy that has acquired an exceptional, abnormal, or 
otherwise unsettled status in the collective memory of a given society.”422 
An unmastered past arises when “the commission of a historic injustice . . . 
has been remembered differently by, and has caused discord between, the 
original perpetrators, victims, and their respective descendants.”423 Until 
these various parties “can reconcile with one another and arrive at some 
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form of consensus about the meaning of a given historical legacy . . . the 
past can safely be described as ‘unmastered.’”424 
This idea of an unmastered past has mostly been applied to countries 
other than the United States.425 Yet, the United States has an unmastered 
past of racial violence that has been a site of contestation since the Civil 
War.426 In Black Reconstruction in America, W. E. B. Du Bois detailed the 
contributions of Black people to the Civil War and Reconstruction to 
counter the accounts of “White historians” who “ascribed the faults and 
failures of Reconstruction to Negro ignorance and corruption.”427 The Civil 
Rights Movement further challenged a whitewashed memory of white 
supremacy and called for historical and ongoing injustices to be 
acknowledged and addressed. W. Fitzhugh Brundage explains that because 
“whites have had to contend with an enfranchised and mobilized black 
population that cannot easily be excluded from civic life . . . [t]he contest 
over interpretation of the southern past . . . has entered the public arena more 
directly than at any time since Reconstruction.”428  
This contest continues today. Political disputes over the history and 
trajectory of the United States have become highly visible in debates over 
Confederate monuments,429 “The 1619 Project,”430 critical race theory,431 
diversity trainings, 432  and “patriotic education.” 433  Far from being new, 
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these debates reflect old and deeply entrenched divisions; competing 
factions of Americans have built entire worldviews around their 
perspectives on racial injustices and the government’s role in handling 
them.434  
Different sides in this contest are not similarly situated with regards to 
the transitional justice interests at stake. In particular, the histories and 
perspectives of oppressed groups have special importance in the 
construction of memory.435  Former U.N. Special Rapporteur on torture, 
Juan E. Méndez, calls for active participation of victims and survivors in 
memorialization so that “‘impermissible lies’ will not be allowed to remain 
a part of the historical record.”436 America’s unmastered past preserves a 
dominant, white view of Black oppression that underestimates past and 
present systemic racism and what must be done about it.437 
U.S. Supreme Court opinions are both illustrative and constitutive of this 
unmastered past. Some disagreements in deeply divided cases are factual 
disputes, such as when opinions split over whether a place was historically 
segregated.438 However, most disagreements are less about historical fact 
and more about interpretations of past events and their implications for 
present times, such as when Justices have fundamentally different 
interpretations of the trajectory of American society.439  Intense judicial 
disagreement over the past reflects and maintains its unmastered status, 
especially given the frequency of racial equality cases before the Court.440 
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Transitional justice mechanisms aim to establish a historical record of 
systemic violence and its causes. Such a historical record is important for 
countering denial about the extent and impact of systemic violence, 
addressing patterns of violence in reform efforts, and achieving societal 
reconciliation. 441  Could a national truth commission with widely 
disseminated findings establish a more accurate and authoritative historical 
record?442 If the Supreme Court is unable to implement solutions such as 
these, and continues to reinforce rather than resolve disputes over America’s 
historical legacies, other segments of society will need to take the lead. 
CONCLUSION: PATHS FORWARD 
This Article has shown how transitional reasoning has shaped, and may 
continue to shape, the Supreme Court’s race jurisprudence. In an ideal 
world, this Article’s analysis would lead the Court to better reconcile 
distancing with reckoning, accounting for where racial discrimination and 
disparities continue to structure everyday life. Such a jurisprudence would 
acknowledge the persistence of structural racism in the United States and 
Americans’ role in perpetuating and benefiting from it.443 It would promote 
collective responsibility and structural approaches for the problem of racism 
and uphold laws and practices designed to tackle it. As this jurisprudence 
secures robust protections for racial minorities, it would also reduce their 
estrangement from the law by better reflecting and respecting their 
experiences.444 This more rigorous reckoning could be undertaken in the 
name of a more genuine distancing. 
In reality, however, the Roberts Court seems ready to abandon racial 
reckoning in favor of an illusory distancing. By casting civil rights measures 
aside as obsolete and even detrimental, such a jurisprudence would help to 
maintain America’s legacies of racism as well as Americans’ 
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misperceptions regarding racial equality, 445  impeding possibilities for 
transition.  
The fact that “transitional justice” has never appeared in a Supreme 
Court opinion does not detract from the utility of a transitional analysis.446 
Even if the Court does not take up a stance more richly rooted in transitional 
justice principles, this Article invites academics to more carefully 
interrogate its transitional reasoning. By invoking the more expansive 
understandings of human rights and theories of societal change that 
characterize critical transitional justice approaches, academics can evaluate 
the factual and normative assumptions of legal arguments and supplant or 
supplement the transitional pathways advanced by the Court. For example, 
through comparison with the larger universe of concerns that animate 
transitional justice approaches and how these concerns have played out in 
other countries, academics may examine how court decisions have failed to 
address specific problems and consider alternate responses. 
By examining how different judges interpret transition, academics might 
be better able to identify actions and arguments that might withstand the 
scrutiny of an evolving Supreme Court. Advocates, in turn, might be better 
able to justify these interventions by tailoring arguments to specific judges. 
For instance, Chief Justice Roberts may be better persuaded to uphold 
certain civil rights measures by legal arguments that recognize both 
continuity with and discontinuity from the nation’s past. Adopting a 
transitional perspective, arguments tailored to the Chief Justice would 
demonstrate that civil rights measures are worth preserving even though 
(and ideally because) the nation has changed since the Civil Rights era.447 
By contrast, Justices Gorsuch and Kavanaugh may be better persuaded to 
reject contemporary forms of racism by tracing them to a form practiced in 
an earlier era, thus demonstrating continuity between “[t]hen and now.”448 
By making strategic transitional arguments, advocates can seek to reorient 
a predominantly distancing jurisprudence toward greater racial reckoning. 
Beyond tailoring arguments to specific judges, legal advocates may seek 
to imbue racial equality law with more expansive and emancipatory 
understandings of transition, including from the past. For instance, contrary 
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to Chief Justice Roberts’ insistence that transitional measures have fixed 
deadlines, Dr. King noted that “the [Brown] court did not set a definite 
deadline for the termination of this process” and only expected Americans 
to work toward “a smooth and peaceful transition.”449  Reasoning from 
transition opens new avenues for not only framing racial injustices as 
international human rights violations, but also making more critical 
perspectives on racial transition throughout history cognizable by law.450  
For Court enthusiasts and skeptics alike,451 it is important to recognize 
that racial transition is most successfully pursued through a wide array of 
strategies in diverse fora, including city councils, state legislatures and 
courts, Congress, and other democratic decision-making bodies. For 
example, passing laws such as the For the People Act, which restores key 
protections of the Voting Rights Act, and the Ending Qualified Immunity 
Act could overcome certain judicially created impediments to transition.452 
Passing the John Lewis Voting Rights Advancement Act based on “current 
conditions” could help to curtail regressive transitional reasoning by 
courts.453 The George Floyd Justice in Policing Act and the Confederate 
Monument Removal Act could directly address transitional justice 
concerns, including accountability, memorialization, and repair.454  
Transitional justice measures, when implemented properly, can get to the 
roots of historical injustices and work toward creating a more just society.455 
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Throughout the United States, truth and reconciliation processes could be 
initiated to grapple with the legacies of racial oppression.456 In June 2020, 
Rep. Barbara Lee called for a U.S. Commission on Truth, Racial Healing, 
and Transformation, and a number of cities followed with plans for their 
own truth, justice, and reconciliation commissions. 457  Since the U.N.’s 
failure to create an international commission of inquiry on U.S. racism that 
same month, there have been discussions of forming a nationwide “people’s 
commission” on racism.458 Implementation of such American commissions 
should build on the lessons learned from foreign ones, which are extensively 
studied in the transitional justice literature.459  
Communities could undertake symbolic reparations, including public 
acts of atonement, establishment of museums, and changing of names, as 
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well as material reparations.460 Recently, cities including Evanston, Illinois, 
Asheville, North Carolina, and Providence, Rhode Island, announced plans 
to initiate “reparations” processes.461 Collective forms of reparations—such 
as service packages (including medical, educational, and housing 
assistance), development and social investment, and “racism response 
funds”—could be effective and viable steps toward reconciliation. 462 
Georgetown University plans to finance health clinics and schools in 
Louisiana to reach the descendants of the enslaved people from whom 
Georgetown profited.463 These commitments, though limited, could pave 
the way for more comprehensive efforts. 
While American transitional justice discourse has aptly focused on 
reparations, transitional justice can encompass structural changes to address 
the causes of conflict and avoid its repetition. 464  In the United States, 
transitional justice can help frame changes in public education, criminal 
legal systems, and electoral and judicial institutions; for instance, 
movements to end mass incarceration have been called transitional justice 
efforts.465 Inasmuch as the Supreme Court impedes America’s transition 
from white supremacy, Supreme Court reform may itself be understood as 
a transitional justice measure.466 Beyond institutional changes, universal 
reforms aimed at redistribution and cancellation of debts may help to 
address embedded inequalities and similarly be justified on transitional 
justice grounds. Isolated transitional justice measures are likely to be 
inadequate, ineffective, and even counterproductive without accompanying 
structural changes. 
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Localized measures may be necessary in many cases, as racist policies, 
racialized experiences, and race relations all vary by region.467 As Sherrilyn 
Ifill puts it: “Historically, racism was felt, lived, and perpetrated locally. 
Reconciliation, therefore, must also be local.”468 By delivering the kinds of 
reckoning and reconciliation that the United States has failed to realize at 
the national level, local government and community actions can carve out 
promising paths to “domesticating” transitional justice norms.469 Given the 
sheer size of the United States, localized measures may be unavoidable; yet, 
they may also be insufficient to address racial injustices and may be seen to 
absolve all levels of government of their obligations.470 Ultimately, local 
actions must influence national ones. The Biden Administration should 
coordinate a program to address the history and legacies of American 
racism,471 building on lessons learned at home and abroad.472 
The persistence of racism is visible in the endemic violence against 
Black people and in the racialized impact of and response to COVID-19.473 
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Racial justice movements such as the Movement for Black Lives are leading 
structural changes in American society.474  Their demands are linked as 
much to the past and future as to the present. Protesters today are not 
demanding discrete remedies for discrete harms. Instead, they are calling 
for a comprehensive and coordinated transition process that deals with the 
history, legacy, and future threat of white supremacy in the United States. 
As Americans seek to actualize this transition process through or beyond 
the Supreme Court, they have much to learn from and contribute to global 
conversations around transitional justice. 
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